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CONFRONTING THE TWO FACES OF CORPORATE FRAUD 
Miriam H. Baer* 
Abstract 
Some criminals engage in meticulous planning. Others commit 
crimes in the heat of the moment. Corporate fraud incorporates both 
planned and spur-of-the-moment misconduct. Although law and 
economics scholars have traditionally viewed corporate fraud as a 
manifestation of opportunism among the corporation’s agents, a new 
generation of scholars, influenced by findings in behavioral 
psychology, has focused on the temporal aspects of corporate 
misconduct. Wrongdoing comes about, not simply because an agent 
opportunistically takes advantage of her principal, but also because 
her short-term self falls prey to temptations and cognitive biases that 
effectively disable her law-abiding long-term self.  
Although the law and economics and behavioral psychology 
accounts separately offer important lessons for observers of corporate 
fraud, neither theory addresses the regulatory implications 
confronting opportunistic behavior and temporal inconsistency at the 
same time. How can an internal corporate enforcer best respond to the 
“two faces” of corporate fraud? This Article explores this question, 
first by analyzing the interaction between the two dispositions, and 
then by considering the relative merits of various enforcement 
approaches.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Some people hurt others by failing to follow through on their best-
laid plans. A corporate manager advises in good faith that he will 
commence the long-term project that will enhance his unit’s earnings 
and make it more competitive over time. Nevertheless, at the end of 
the month, he finds that he is no closer to implementing the new 
project than he was when he first pitched it to his supervisor. To make 
things worse, when the manager is asked to report his unit’s monthly 
progress, he falsely asserts that he has worked steadily on the project, 
going so far as to submit fraudulent expense reports to demonstrate 
significant efforts towards achieving his goal.  
Other individuals impose harm by meticulously following through 
on their malicious intentions. A murderer who plots an assassination 
2
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and patiently awaits his prey is an extreme example. Bernard 
Madoff’s Ponzi scheme, in which he persuaded thousands of 
unwitting victims to invest their money in nonexistent funds, is the 
less violent version. The problem in both cases is not that an 
individual changes his mind, but rather, that the individual adheres to 
and carries out his maleficent plans. This is the very type of 
consistency that Bernard Madoff’s sentencing court found so 
chilling.1  
The dichotomy between people who fail to adhere to their positive 
plans and those who steadfastly carry out their evil intentions poses a 
significant challenge for law enforcers. If individuals engage in 
varying degrees of opportunistic behavior and simultaneously enjoy 
different degrees of self-control, how can we effectively deter 
wrongdoing? 
This Article explores this question with regard to the pervasive and 
recurring problem of corporate fraud, in which corporate managers 
defraud the corporate entity and its shareholders through some 
combination of deliberate misrepresentations and false statements.2 
Although this Article focuses on what is commonly classified as 
“securities” or “accounting fraud,” much of the analysis is 
generalizable to other forms of wrongdoing, such as bribery and 
embezzlement.3  
The law and economics literature views corporate fraud as an 
extreme example of the agency-cost problem.4 Corporate agents abuse 
their discretion and authority to take advantage of their principals.5 At 
                                                                                                                    
 1. See Benjamin Weiser, Judge Explains 150-Year Sentence for Madoff, N.Y. TIMES 
(June 28, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/29/nyregion/judge-denny-chin-recounts-his-
thoughts-in-bernard-madoff-sentencing.html (recounting Judge Denny Chin’s views of 
Madoff’s crime); see also Transcript of Proceedings as to Bernard L. Madoff Held on June 29, 
2009 at 10:00 AM Before Judge Denny Chin at 42–49, United States v. Bernard L. Madoff, 
No. 09-CR-00213 (S.D.N.Y. July 20, 2009), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/usao/nys/madoff/20090629sentencingtranscriptcorrected.pdf (“The 
breach of trust was massive. Investors—individuals, charities, pension funds, institutional 
clients—were repeatedly lied to . . . .”).  
 2. See, e.g., Daniel T. Ostas, When Fraud Pays: Executive Self-Dealing and the Failure 
of Self-Restraint, 44 AM. BUS. L.J. 571, 571 (2007) (defining fraud broadly as the type of 
conduct “by which one individual can gain an advantage over another through deliberate false 
suggestion, concealment, or misrepresentation of the truth”).  
 3. For an exhaustive look at the different types of fraud that arise within the corporation, 
see generally JOSEPH T. WELLS, CORPORATE FRAUD HANDBOOK: PREVENTION AND DETECTION 
2–4 (3d ed. 2011). 
 4. “Securities fraud may best be understood as a species of agency costs.” Amanda M. 
Rose, The Multienforcer Approach to Securities Fraud Deterrence: A Critical Analysis, 158 U. 
PA. L. REV. 2173, 2182 (2010). 
 5. See, e.g., Usha Rodrigues, From Loyalty to Conflict: Addressing Fiduciary Duty at 
the Officer Level, 61 FLA. L. REV. 1, 3 & n.1 (2009) (ascribing corporate wrongdoing to 
conflicts of interest and managerial agency costs). The seminal account on agency costs is set 
3
Baer: Confronting the Two Faces of Corporate Fraud
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository,
90 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66 
 
numerous junctures, the agent favors himself over the larger populace 
in whose favor the agent is supposed to act.6 In response, the law 
offers a combination of sticks and carrots to better bind the agent to 
his principal and deter the agent’s self-serving and opportunistic 
behavior.7  
Meanwhile, an alternative view explains wrongdoing as the result 
of a momentary lapse of judgment. According to this narrative, 
individuals engage in misconduct when they fall prey to their short-
term desires, despite their more socially desirable long-term plans.8 
The short-term self acts in ways that the long-term self explicitly 
abhors, up to and including perpetrating violations of law.9 The short-
term self can impose costs either by repeatedly failing to commence 
activities that carry large up-front costs, but are ultimately beneficial, 
(e.g., procrastination), or by engaging too easily (or too often) in 
activities that are initially pleasant, but ultimately harmful (e.g., 
overconsumption).10  
Behavioral researchers explain these lapses as the result of a 
phenomenon known as “hyperbolic discounting.” Whereas rational 
individuals simply value the present over the future, hyperbolic 
discounters impose an excessively large discount on changes in utility 
that occur closest to the present, leading some to call the preference 
an “immediacy” or “present bias.”11 The bias persists because the 
discount the individual assigns a given interval is very high for near 
term periods, but much smaller for periods that occur at some later 
                                                                                                                    
forth in Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, 
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308–12 (1976). 
 6. “Agency costs exist whenever a principal entrusts power to an agent to act on her 
behalf. The agent may rent-seek, . . . shirk her duty[,] or slack off. Or she may seek to fulfill her 
job in good faith, but make choices that her principal would not want her to make.” Usha 
Rodrigues, Entity and Identity, 60 EMORY L.J. 1257, 1267 (2011). For a discussion of agency 
costs generally and their relationship to corporate crime, see Jennifer Arlen, The Potentially 
Perverse Effects of Corporate Criminal Liability, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 833, 834–35 (1994). 
 7. See, e.g., Nicola Faith Sharpe, Process Over Structure: An Organizational Behavior 
Approach to Improving Corporate Boards, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 261, 264–65 (2012) (observing 
that “[m]ost current regulation and regulatory reform proposals attempt to reduce corporate 
failure by reducing agency costs”). 
 8. E.g., Manuel A. Utset, Time-Inconsistent Management and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 
31 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 417, 418 (2005).  
 9. Drew Fudenberg & David K. Levine, A Dual-Self Model of Impulse Control, 96 AM. 
ECON. REV. 1449, 1449–51 (2006).  
 10. See, e.g., Brian Galle & Manuel Utset, Is Cap-and-Trade Fair to the Poor? 
Shortsighted Households and the Timing of Consumption Taxes, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 33, 
65–68 (2010) (setting forth a mathematical model for overconsumption and procrastination). 
 11. “Stable, time-consistent preferences require a constant exponential discount factor; 
hyperbolic discounting generates time-inconsistent preferences, sometimes described as present 
bias.” Joshua D. Wright & Douglas H. Ginsburg, Behavioral Law and Economics: Its Origins, 
Fatal Flaws, and Implications for Liberty, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1033, 1043 (2012). 
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date.12 Waiting an hour from “now” for a piece of chocolate cake 
feels much worse than waiting the same hour if that wait is slated to 
occur in some future period.13 By the same token, commencing a 
difficult project—such as a long paper—feels inordinately more 
difficult the day the writer sits down at his computer than one week 
from today, when the same writer plans to commence the very same 
project. Because of these differences, hyperbolic individuals have a 
tendency to switch course in often unexpected and self-destructive 
ways.14  
The temporal inconsistency literature prescribes a significantly 
different role for legal actors from the standard law and economics 
canon. Instead of manipulating incentives for good behavior, legal 
actors should help individuals find ways to control their short-term 
selves.15 The mechanism that sophisticated individuals adopt in order 
to restrain their temporal inconsistency is often referred to as a 
“precommitment device.”16 The device “precommits” the individual 
to his long-term plans by eliminating, or making more difficult, 
certain options in advance of some foreseen event.17 Through legal 
rules and institutions, legal actors can either mandate or encourage the 
                                                                                                                    
 12. “Hyperbolic discounting involves very steep discounting in the immediate short run 
and much shallower discounting further out.” Lee Anne Fennell, Unbundling Risk, 60 DUKE 
L.J. 1285, 1348 n.256, 1349 n.259 (2011) (citing GEORGE AINSLIE, BREAKDOWN OF WILL 32 & 
fig.2B (2001)); see also Lee Anne Fennell, Willpower Taxes, 99 GEO. L.J. 1371, 1378 n.35 
(2011) [hereinafter Fennell, Willpower Taxes]. 
 13. “[F]or many people, preferences between logically identical sets of choices may 
reverse in a predictable direction as the temporal context of the choice changes.” Russell B. 
Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality 
Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 1051, 1120 (2000) (explaining 
preference switching).  
 14. Cf., e.g., id. (“An individual might plan to save X percent of her salary next year but 
then decide when she receives it that she prefers to spend it rather than save (thus making 
appropriate the cliché that money can ‘burn a hole’ in one’s pocket).”). 
 15. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an 
Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1159, 1159, 1162 (2003) (arguing that government can and 
should “steer people’s choices in welfare-promoting directions” by framing choices in 
particular ways). For an extended account of how government can do this in various consumer-
oriented contexts, see generally RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING 
DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008).  
 16. Ulysses’ decision to tie himself to the mast of his ship and plug his sailors’ ears with 
wax in advance of sailing near the Sirens is the classic example. 1 HOMER, THE ODYSSEY 445, 
447 (A.T. Murray trans., Harvard Univ. Press 1919); see also John A. Robertson, “Paying the 
Alligator”: Precommitment in Law, Bioethics, and Constitutions, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1729, 1731 
(2003). See generally JON ELSTER, ULYSSES UNBOUND: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY, 
PRECOMMITMENT, AND CONSTRAINTS (2000) (examining the benefits of, and philosophical 
justifications for, precommitment devices). For additional discussion, see infra Section I.D. 
 17. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Precommitment Strategies in Corporate Law: The Case 
of Dead Hand and No Hand Pills, 29 J. CORP. L. 1, 4–5 (2003) (describing and explaining 
precommitment strategies in corporate governance).  
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adoption of precommitment devices. 
Numerous scholars have written separately on temporal 
inconsistency and corporate opportunism, and several scholars, most 
notably Professor Manuel Utset, have explored the connection 
between temporal inconsistency and corporate crime and 
governance.18 This Article expands on this scholarship, first by 
considering how both opportunism and temporal inconsistency 
interact within the corporate firm, and then by considering how this 
interaction challenges the corporation’s internal compliance 
department.19 The compliance department is the internal unit tasked 
with preventing and reducing serious wrongdoing within the 
organization.20 If fraud arises out of both opportunistic and temporally 
inconsistent behavior, the corporation’s compliance personnel bear 
the burden of comprehending and responding effectively to these 
                                                                                                                    
 18. Professor Utset has written extensively on this topic and was one of the first legal 
scholars to demonstrate temporal inconsistency’s relationship to corporate crime. See, e.g., 
Manuel A. Utset, Corporate Actors, Corporate Crimes and Time-Inconsistent Preferences, 1 
VA. J. CRIM. L. 265, 320–24 (2013) (praising portions of the Sarbanes-Oxley and Dodd-Frank 
Acts as counterweights to temporal inconsistency in corporations); Manuel A. Utset, 
Hyperbolic Criminals and Repeated Time-Inconsistent Misconduct, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 609, 
623–25, 659 (2007) [hereinafter Utset, Hyperbolic Criminals] (applying temporal inconsistency 
theory to explain white-collar criminal conduct); Utset, supra note 8, at 418, 428–29 (arguing 
that “adherence to the time-consistency assumption can lead to mistaken policy decisions” 
regarding corporate managers). For more general analyses of temporal inconsistency theory to 
criminal law and procedure, see Richard H. McAdams, Present Bias and Criminal Law, 2011 
U. ILL. L. REV. 1607, 1614–28, and Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, Crime, Punishment, and the 
Psychology of Self-Control, 61 EMORY L.J. 501, 545–52 (2012). McAdams also briefly touched 
upon the subject in a discussion of the signaling value of social norms. See Richard H. 
McAdams, Signaling Discount Rates: Law, Norms, and Economic Methodology, 110 YALE L.J. 
625, 657–61 (2001) [hereinafter McAdams, Signaling] (reviewing ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND 
SOCIAL NORMS (2000)) (explaining how inconsistent discount rates complicate Posner’s 
contention that so-called social norms reflect low discount rates that individuals signal to each 
other).  
 19. Whether this department is a stand-alone function or should be housed within the 
corporation’s legal department is a source of substantial debate. See, e.g., Michele DeStefano, 
Beyond Benchmarking: How Should Law and Corporate Compliance Intersect?, SLIDESHARE 
(Nov. 14, 2012), http://www.slideshare.net/micheledestefano/beyond-benchmarking-how-
should-law-and-corporate-compliance-intersect (presentation at Harvard Law School Program 
on the Legal Profession); Michele DeStefano, Creating A Culture of Compliance: Why 
Departmentalization May Not Be the Answer, 10 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 71, 82–86 (2014). 
 20. “‘Compliance’ is a system of policies and controls that organizations adopt to deter 
violations of law and to assure external authorities that they are taking steps to deter violations 
of law.” Miriam H. Baer, Governing Corporate Compliance, 50 B.C. L. REV. 949, 958 (2009). 
Professor Paul McGreal has conducted surveys on corporate compliance and compliance law 
and regulation for at least the last eight years. See Paul E. McGreal, Corporate Compliance 
Survey, 68 BUS. LAW. 163, 163 & n.1 (2012). For earlier analyses of compliance programs 
adopted in response to specific settlement agreements with federal agencies, see generally F. 
Joseph Warin & Jason C. Schwartz, Corporate Compliance Programs as a Component of Plea 
Agreements and Civil and Administrative Settlements, 24 J. CORP. L. 71 (1998).  
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overlapping causes.21  
This Article adopts the premise that individuals are, by varying 
degrees, opportunistic and temporally inconsistent. To better 
understand how these two dispositions interact, the Article 
hypothesizes a simplified world in which individuals simultaneously 
occupy positions on two different spectra at any given time. The first 
spectrum refers to the individual’s motivation towards others, and the 
second indicates the individual’s ability to act consistently over 
successive periods of time. The interaction between these two 
dispositions generates a typology of employees who are:  
 
(a) well-motivated, and temporally consistent;  
(b) well-motivated, and temporally inconsistent;  
(c) opportunistic, and temporally inconsistent; and  
(d) opportunistic and temporally consistent.  
 
From this typology, one can see why corporate fraud so often mixes 
planned and impulsive conduct. With the exception of the employees 
in category (a), everyone within the corporation has the potential to 
contribute to or perpetrate a fraud.  
Having identified this typology, this Article introduces a number 
of strategies an internal corporate enforcer might employ in response 
to these various prototypes. Although compliance personnel have 
developed a plethora of programs in response to potential 
wrongdoing, much of their work falls within two categories: the 
corporate policing approach that is familiar to many, and a structural 
approach one might call “corporate architecture.”22 The policing 
approach reduces corporate crime by empowering internal policemen 
to identify, punish, and deter actual and would-be transgressors. The 
                                                                                                                    
 21. The Article thus takes up the task suggested by Professor Daniel Medwed’s comment 
on Professor Utset’s work. See Daniel S. Medwed, Comment, Deterrence Theory and the 
Corporate Criminal Actor: Professor Utset’s Fresh Take on an Old Problem, 1 VA. J. CRIM. L. 
65, 66 (2013) (querying whether “internal regulation can also be used to protect against the 
potential overconsumption of criminal activity that derives from time-inconsistent preferences” 
(emphasis omitted)). It also builds on the distinction I first raised elsewhere regarding the 
difference between “sanction-based enforcement” and “structural regulation.” Miriam H. Baer, 
Temporal Inconsistency and the Regulation of Corporate Misconduct, 1 VA. J. CRIM. L. 350, 
360–69 (2013). 
 22. The structural approach is similar to situational crime prevention, which has been 
defined as “‘the conscious design or manipulation of immediate environments . . . to make 
crime more difficult, more risky, and/or less rewarding . . . to potential offenders.’” Danny 
Rosenthal, Assessing Digital Preemption (and the Future of Law Enforcement?), 14 NEW 
CRIM. L. REV. 576, 580 (2011) (alterations in original) (quoting Tim Hope & Richard Sparks, 
For a Sociological Theory of Situations (or How Useful Is Pragmatic Criminology?), in 
ETHICAL AND SOCIAL PERSPECTIVES ON SITUATIONAL CRIME PREVENTION 175, 175 n.2 (Andrew 
von Hirsch et al. eds., 2000)). Both approaches are discussed more extensively infra Part III.  
7
Baer: Confronting the Two Faces of Corporate Fraud
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository,
94 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66 
 
architectural approach encourages corporate personnel to seek out and 
mitigate problematic situations as opposed to problematic people. It 
seeks proactively to improve decision-making systems, thereby 
reducing the opportunity and temptation for fraud. It is at once less 
judgmental and yet potentially more intrusive. 
The optimal mix of policing and architecture should vary for 
different corporations. A number of characteristics in today’s 
enforcement environment, however, favor policing over architecture, 
which in turn may harm shareholders and the general public. 
This Article unfolds in four parts. Part I briefly reviews the 
opportunism and temporal inconsistency literatures and analyzes their 
contribution to our understanding of fraud and optimal enforcement 
strategies. Drawing upon these two theories, Part II constructs a 
typology of wrongdoers (and do-gooders) within the corporation. This 
typology, in turn, should guide the corporations’s internal compliance 
efforts.  
Part III discusses the contrasts between two internal enforcement 
approaches: policing and architecture. The two approaches can serve 
either as substitutes or complements. Policing offers strong 
protections against consistent, opportunistic wrongdoers; architecture 
provides more value to populations that are generally well-motivated 
but prone to hyperbolic behavior. Both approaches are essential 
components of an effective corporate compliance program.  
Finally, Part IV examines and critiques the current state of affairs 
in corporate compliance. If corporate fraud truly has “two faces,” then 
corporate compliance departments need to focus on generating as 
many good architects as policemen. For a number of reasons, 
however, it is doubtful that compliance departments are striking the 
right balance. This Article therefore ends with a call for a more 
sustained analysis of the interaction between temporal inconsistency 
and opportunistic behavior. 
I.  OPPORTUNISTIC AGENTS AND TEMPORALLY INCONSISTENT 
DECISION MAKERS 
Despite their obvious differences, Fortune 500 corporations, 
privately owned businesses, nonprofits, and public agencies all share 
in common key organizational characteristics. As soon as they reach a 
certain size, most if not all include bureaucratic centers and 
supervisory relationships between employees and managers.23 When 
                                                                                                                    
 23. See Oliver E. Williamson, The Organization of Work, 1 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 5, 
35 (1980) (predicting the emergence of hierarchy in “organizations of any size,” including 
private businesses, nonprofits, and government agencies). For an argument that corporate law 
itself, by vesting authority in a board of directors, fuels hierarchy, see Stephen M. Bainbridge, 
Director Primacy, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE LAW 17, 23 
8
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they behave well, these organizations provide great benefits to 
society, as they efficiently allocate resources, achieve agreed-upon 
redistributive goals, and provide tangible and intangible 
improvements in public welfare.24  
Sometimes, however, organizations do not behave well. Or, since 
organizations lack a mind or soul, the more accurate claim is that 
some or all of their members do not behave well.25 Those who occupy 
the highest ranks of authority within their organizations abuse their 
discretion, slack off when no one is noticing, ignore internal rules, 
engage in self-dealing, violate external laws, and cause all sorts of 
harm to both outsiders and other members of the organization. Taken 
as a whole, these harms comprise the agency costs that have long 
been the focus of scholars who write about private and public 
organizations.26  
In recent decades, the specter of fraud has emerged as a significant 
threat to corporations and capital markets. Fraud triggers enforcement 
actions based in federal criminal and civil statutes, such as the mail, 
wire, and securities fraud statutes.27 Criminal and civil enforcement 
actions deter harmful conduct by increasing the “price” of 
wrongdoing,28 and communicate society’s moral condemnation of the 
deceptive behavior that causes investors economic harm.  
What the antifraud statutes do not do, however, is parse 
                                                                                                                    
(Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell eds., 2012). 
 24.  “[C]orporations . . . are encouraged, and granted rights because they serve the goal of 
promoting overall societal wealth.” Steven M.H. Wallman, Understanding the Purpose of a 
Corporation: An Introduction, 24 J.CORP. L. 807, 810 (1999) (arguing that corporations exist to 
benefit society as a whole). 
 25. Economists view corporate crime through the eyes of the individual: “Corporate 
crimes are not committed by corporations; they are committed by agents of the corporation.” 
Arlen, supra note 6, at 834; see also Sharon Oded, Inducing Corporate Compliance: A 
Compound Corporate Liability Regime, 31 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 272, 274 (2011) (agreeing 
that individual agents commit corporate crimes, but arguing that corporations must be held 
responsible in part to ensure adequate deterrence). By contrast, sociologists and organizational 
theorists perceive corporate crime as the product of organizational and cultural factors. See, 
e.g., James A. Fanto, Recognizing the “Bad Barrel” in Public Business Firms: Social and 
Organizational Factors in Misconduct by Senior Decision-Makers, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 1, 1 
(2009) (examining the “importance of group and organizational factors in senior-level 
misconduct within the firm”); Edward L. Rubin, Images of Organizations and Consequences of 
Regulation, 6 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 347, 348 (2005) (comparing and explaining different 
models). 
 26. See generally Jensen & Meckling, supra note 5, at 308–10 (discussing agency costs).  
 27. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343, 1348 (2006); 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b), 78ff(a) (2006). 
 28. “[T]he economists’ response to how to deter misconduct is to price any misbehavior. 
Assuming the entity and its agents are rational economic actors, misbehavior will occur only 
when its expected utility exceeds the disutility of its accompanying punishment.” James D. 
Cox, Private Litigation and the Deterrence of Corporate Misconduct, LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS., Autumn 1997, at 1, 2. 
9
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opportunism and temporal inconsistency. Instead, they more or less 
presume some basic level of planning by which defendants take 
advantage of others. For example, the mail, wire, and securities fraud 
statutes29 all punish an individual’s participation in a “scheme to 
defraud,”30 and yet make no distinction between meticulously planned 
and executed schemes and hastily-slapped-together schemes.31 
Indeed, even the word “scheme” is misleading, as a spur-of-the-
moment misrepresentation of material fact satisfies the securities 
fraud statute, and also arguably meets the definition of the term 
“scheme” for both mail and wire fraud prosecutions.32  
Modern-day jurists and scholars have focused almost exclusively 
on the intended meaning of the mens rea component of the fraud 
statutes, such as whether fraud requires intentional or merely reckless 
behavior,33 and whether the harm caused must be economic, or should 
                                                                                                                    
 29. The federal mail and wire fraud statutes criminalize an individual’s intentional 
participation in a “scheme or artifice to defraud” another of his property, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 
1343, 1348(1), or “intangible right to honest services.” Id. § 1346. The mail and wire fraud 
statutes further criminalize a scheme that has the purpose of “obtaining money or property by 
means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises.” Id. §§ 1341, 1343, 
1348(2).  
 30. Section 10 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881, 
891 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j), outlaws any “manipulative [or] deceptive device” and 
authorizes the SEC’s Rule 10b-5, which makes it illegal for any person to “employ any device, 
scheme, or artifice to defraud” or “[t]o make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit 
to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the 
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading” or “[t]o engage in any act, 
practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any 
person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.” 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2013). 
Federal prosecutors may charge violations of Rule 10b-5 criminally when the prohibited 
conduct is “willful.” 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a). 
 31. The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines previously provided a “more than minimal planning” 
sentence enhancement for crimes that involved either “repeated acts” or attempts at 
concealment, thus suggesting that statutory fraud could arise from “minimal” planning. See 
Frank O. Bowman, III, Pour encourager les autres? The Curious History and Distressing 
Implications of the Criminal Provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Sentencing 
Guidelines Amendments that Followed, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 373, 386 n.79 (2004). After the 
enhancement became so commonplace that it was meaningless, the Sentencing Commission 
eliminated it in 2001. See id. at 407. 
 32. See supra note 29; see also, e.g., United States v. Trapilo, 130 F.3d 547, 550 n.3 (2d 
Cir. 1997) (rejecting defendant’s claim that a “simple . . . smuggling” scheme “without an 
allegation of misrepresentation or deceit” did not meet the definition of wire fraud statute); 
United States v. Herzig, 26 F.2d 487, 489 (S.D.N.Y. 1928) (“A scheme to defraud may be 
simple in its plan and execution, or it may be elaborate and may require a wide-spread 
campaign involving many victims.”). 
 33. The federal criminal mail and wire fraud statutes require that the government prove 
that the defendant “knowingly and willfully participated in the scheme or artifice to 
defraud . . . with specific intent to defraud.” 2 LEONARD B. SAND ET AL., MODERN FEDERAL 
JURY INSTRUCTIONS—CRIMINAL ¶ 44.01, at 444 (2002) (Instruction 44-3).  
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include intangible harms such as harm to one’s right to “honest 
services.”34 One rarely sees, however, an extended discussion of the 
differences between well-planned deception and spur-of-the-moment 
fraud.35 By contrast, courts and legislatures have long recognized and 
debated the “heat of passion” doctrine for homicide, as well as the 
relevance of premeditation for grading homicide offenses.36 For fraud, 
however, none of these gradations have made their way into federal 
criminal statutes. A scheme to defraud is all that is needed.  
Admittedly, pragmatists have good reason to reject statutory 
distinctions. A two-tiered approach that imposed stronger sanctions 
on “premeditated fraud” could potentially trigger a series of false 
positives and negatives, as well as increased litigation and associated 
administrative costs. Defendants might (falsely) claim that their 
frauds were the result of momentary willpower lapses, whereas 
prosecutors would be tempted to see all frauds as well planned. More 
importantly, jurists might encounter difficulty defining the term 
“premeditation,” particularly for frauds in which a defendant initially 
engaged in wrongdoing due to a willpower lapse, but then continued 
the fraud for some period of time, either to cover up his original lapse, 
or to take further advantage of others.37  
Accordingly, by accident or design, we have a general law of fraud 
that requires participation in a scheme, or, in the securities context, 
either an “untrue statement of . . . material fact” or conduct that 
“would operate as a fraud or deceit on any person” in connection with 
the purchase or sale of a security.38 In addition, participation in the 
proscribed conduct must be “willful” for criminal liability or at least 
“reckless” for civil liability.39 The underlying temporal context in 
                                                                                                                    
 34. See, e.g., Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2931 (2010) (describing schemes 
that fit into the “honest services” doctrine). For a critique of the opinion’s treatment of “honest 
services,” see generally Samuel W. Buell, The Court’s Fraud Dud, 6 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. 
POL’Y (SPECIAL ISSUE) 31 (2010). 
 35. Presumably, even a spur-of-the-moment deception would fall within that category of 
wrongs that Professor Samuel Buell labels “core” fraud, which comprises an offender’s 
intentional deception of another person in order to cause that victim “to do or to relinquish 
something voluntarily that the victim otherwise would not do.” Samuel W. Buell, What is 
Securities Fraud?, 61 DUKE L.J. 511, 526 (2011). 
 36. See SANFORD H. KADISH ET AL., CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 436–37 (9th ed. 
2012) (discussing the relevance of premeditation). For a discussion on provocation and its role 
in the “legislative grading” of intentional homicide offenses, see id. at 427–63. 
 37. Some of these problems have caused observers to question the imposition of harsher 
punishment for “premeditated” murders. See Kimberly Kessler Ferzan, Plotting 
Premeditation’s Demise, 75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 83, 86 (2012) (arguing that 
premeditation “is woefully under- and overinclusive”). 
 38. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2013).  
 39. The Supreme Court has never fully explained the scienter requirement for Rule 10b-5 
securities fraud claims, and lower courts have failed to define with any consistency the term 
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which the fraud arose is only of interest, if at all, to the court 
exercising discretion at sentencing.40  
Even if criminal fraud statutes fail to parse timing and motivation, 
there is no reason that internal corporate law enforcers should also fail 
to do so. Punishment and prevention, after all, are very different 
concepts; the tools we find most effective for one may not be the ones 
we find most effective for the other. Accordingly, this Part attempts to 
unpack these two dispositions.  
A.  Opportunistic Agents 
Economists define an agent as any person who has been delegated 
authority by a principal to act on the principal’s behalf.41 Although 
agency-cost theory has long been a focus of those who study 
corporations, the concept has been used to analyze other relationships, 
such as between public decision makers and the general public.42 
Although the foundational conflict between corporate managers and 
shareholders is often described as an agency-cost problem, the label 
refers primarily to agency theory as opposed to the common law of 
                                                                                                                    
“willfulness” as it is used in the criminal securities fraud context. Buell, supra note 35, at 555–
60 (examining numerous attempts by lower courts to define the term). Thus, the difference 
between “reckless” and “willful” misconduct varies depending on the court. Compare United 
States v. Gansman, 657 F.3d 85, 91 n.7 (2d Cir. 2011) (opining in dicta that, unlike criminal 
liability, civil liability can attach “if the government proves . . . that the defendant’s conduct 
was merely reckless, rather than willful”), with United States v. Tarallo, 380 F.3d 1174, 1188–
89 (9th Cir. 2004) (upholding jury instruction that permitted conviction of defendant if he made 
a representation “with reckless indifference to its truth or falsity”). 
 40. In United States v. Adelson, 441 F. Supp. 2d 506, 513 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), the district 
court justified its decision to impose a sentence well below the range recommended by the U.S. 
Sentencing Guidelines in part because “Adelson  . . . feared the effects of exposing what he had 
belatedly learned.” For a recent analysis of how courts approach white-collar sentencing, see 
generally Todd Haugh, Sentencing the Why of White Collar Crime, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2014), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2244569. 
 41. “[A]n ‘agency problem’—in the most general sense of the term—arises whenever the 
welfare of one party, termed the ‘principal,’ depends upon actions taken by another party, 
termed the ‘agent.’” Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Agency Problems and Legal 
Strategies, in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE & FUNCTIONAL APPROACH 
21, 21 (Reinier Kraakman et al. eds., 2004). For the differences between economic and legal 
agents, see Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell, Fiduciary Duties: The Emerging 
Jurisprudence, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE LAW 133, 135 
(Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell eds., 2012) (“Under the economics definition directors 
are agents of shareholders, while under the legal definition they are not because shareholders 
lack the requisite control.”). 
 42. “[The agency cost problem] exists in all organizations and in all cooperative 
efforts—at every level of management in firms, in universities, in mutual companies, in 
cooperatives, in governmental authorities and bureaus, in unions, and in . . . agency 
relationships . . . .” Jensen & Meckling, supra note 5, at 309 (citation omitted). 
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agency.43  
Throughout the agency-cost literature, the narrative is roughly the 
same: those with decision-making authority (i.e., agents) employ their 
authority and discretion in a manner that benefits themselves at the 
expense of the people who employ them (i.e., principals).44 Within the 
publicly held corporation, the separation of ownership and control 
enables managers to take advantage of uninformed and disorganized 
shareholders.45 Agents harm their principals by being opportunistic 
and by “shirking.”46 Shirking encompasses instances in which an 
agent fails to “devote significant effort” to the tasks delegated by his 
principal.47  
Opportunism is more difficult to define.48 It is a pejorative term 
that suggests a type of behavior that combines self-interest, deception, 
and a willingness to exploit some set of rules. It is, according to 
Oliver Williamson’s famous definition, a form of self-interest seeking 
with guile.49 Guile, in turn, implies an intention to disguise the nature 
                                                                                                                    
 43. Fiduciaries, directors, and officers are not the corporate shareholders’ common law 
agents. See, e.g., D. Theodore Rave, Politicians as Fiduciaries, 126 HARV. L. REV. 671, 699–
700 (2013) (distinguishing corporate fiduciary relationships from common law agency 
relationships). 
 44. “The heart of the dilemma comes from a simple truth: it is expensive (and ultimately 
impossible) to prevent parties from taking self-interested actions when they are given control 
over other people’s money.” George S. Geis, The Space Between Markets and Hierarchies, 95 
VA. L. REV. 99, 110 (2009). 
 45. “Much of the corporate governance in the United States focuses on . . . utilizing 
different monitoring devices available to protect shareholders from losses resulting from the 
separation of ownership from control.” Arthur R. Pinto, An Overview of United States 
Corporate Governance in Publicly Traded Corporations, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 257, 260 (2010). 
 46. “[T]he agent has an incentive to act opportunistically, skimping on the quality of his 
performance, or even diverting to himself some of what was promised to the principal.” 
Hansman & Kraakman, supra note 41, at 21 (citation omitted). 
 47. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 5, at 313. “[S]hirking is defined to include any 
action by a member of a production team that diverges from the interests of the team as a 
whole. . . . [It] includes not only culpable cheating, but also negligence, oversight, incapacity, 
and even honest mistakes.” STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, THE NEW CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN 
THEORY AND PRACTICE 73 n.94 (2008). Extreme shirking is addressed by the fiduciary duty of 
care. Ordinary mismanagement is taken up, if at all, through markets and private contract. See, 
e.g., Mark J. Roe, Abstract, Corporate Law’s Limits, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 233, 233 (2002) 
(observing that “the business judgment rule puts beyond direct legal inquiry most key agency 
costs—such as overexpansion, overinvestment, and reluctance to take on profitable but 
uncomfortable risks”). 
 48. For more on the difficulties of defining opportunism, see Daniel B. Kelly, Strategic 
Spillovers, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1641, 1653–54 (2011). 
 49. Oliver E. Williamson, The Logic of Economic Organization, 4 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 65, 
68 (1988); see also Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 41, at 21 n.2 (defining opportunism as 
“self-interested behavior that involves some element of deception, misrepresentation, or bad 
faith”). Despite Professor Williamson’s widely accepted definition, not all opportunistic 
behavior is in fact guileful or deceptive. For example, Williamson’s famous “hold-up” 
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of one’s conduct or to deceive. It is this notion of guile or deception 
that implies a level of self-awareness that is itself dangerous—the 
individual knows she is doing something the other person might not 
like and she therefore has the incentive and ability to cover her tracks.  
Williamson’s guile-based definition of opportunism coincides 
nicely with popular definitions of white-collar crime. The FBI, for 
example, has defined white-collar crime as acts that “are 
characterized by deceit, concealment, or violation of trust.”50 The 
guileful, deceptive behavior that underlies so-called schemes to 
defraud also defeats markets and undermines the public’s trust.51 It is 
both so morally blameworthy and so economically harmful as to 
justify the government’s intrusion in otherwise private affairs and to 
trigger promises from public officials to publicly condemn and strip 
officers of their worldly possessions.52 Accordingly, even though 
agency costs have long been the “domain of state corporate law,”53 
managerial opportunism has increasingly become the preoccupation 
of federal and state prosecutors and regulators.54 Although state courts 
may have initially crafted doctrines such as the duty of loyalty with 
antifraud norms in mind,55 corporate law has ceded much of antifraud 
enforcement to federal and state enforcement actors.56  
                                                                                                                    
example—whereby an owner of relation-specific assets takes advantage of a contracting party 
who has no other options—is not necessarily guileful or underhanded. See, e.g., Oliver Hart, An 
Economist’s Perspective on the Theory of the Firm, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1757, 1762–63 (1989) 
(explaining Williamson’s hold-up theory). 
 50. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, WHITE COLLAR CRIME: A 
REPORT TO THE PUBLIC 3 (1989). 
 51. For a discussion of the economic justification for criminalizing fraud, see Richard A. 
Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1193, 1195–96 (1985) 
(offering “market bypass” justifications for crimes such as fraud and theft). 
 52. See, e.g., Donald C. Langevoort, On Leaving Corporate Executives “Naked, 
Homeless and Without Wheels”: Corporate Fraud, Equitable Remedies, and the Debate over 
Entity Versus Individual Liability, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 627, 627 (2007). Langevoort was 
quoting former SEC Chairman Richard Breeden. See id. 
 53. Donald C. Langevoort, Internal Controls After Sarbanes-Oxley: Revisiting Corporate 
Law’s “Duty of Care as Responsibility for Systems,” 31 J. CORP. L. 949, 964 (2006). 
Langevoort observes that statutes such as the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act “creat[e] a much 
harsher criminal and civil liability threat if [managerial] noncompliance is detected by the SEC 
or federal prosecutors.” Id. at 966. 
 54. See, e.g., Kulbir Walha & Edward E. Filusch, Eliot Spitzer: A Crusader Against 
Corporate Malfeasance or a Politically Ambitious Spotlight Hound? A Case Study of Eliot 
Spitzer and Marsh & McLennan, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1111, 1112 (2005) (discussing 
Spitzer’s use of New York’s Martin Act to threaten criminal cases against corporations and 
their employees). 
 55. See, e.g., Bayer v. Beran, 49 N.Y.S.2d 2, 6 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1944) (explaining that the 
duty of loyalty’s purpose is “to avoid the possibility of fraud and to avoid the temptation of 
self-interest” (quoting In re Ryan’s Will, 52 N.E.2d 909, 923 (N.Y. 1943))).   
 56. For more on the “federalization” of corporate law and corporate governance in 
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Corporate criminal behavior—particularly securities fraud—is an 
agency cost, albeit one that makes some shareholders better off.57 All 
things being equal, shareholders prefer not to be defrauded in their 
investments. True, some shareholders may benefit temporarily from 
the corporate officer’s decision to fraudulently inflate profits.58 But 
over time, fraud reduces confidence in public markets, decreases 
allocative efficiency, and increases the corporation’s cost of securing 
needed capital.59 Accordingly, officers who commit fraud impose 
long-term costs on themselves, their employees, and the many 
shareholders who are likely to get caught paying the bill when various 
violations of law finally come to light.60  
Admittedly, not all opportunistic behavior is covered by federal 
criminal or securities laws. The Supreme Court’s narrowing of 
“honest services” fraud in Skilling v. United States now leaves 
                                                                                                                    
particular, see generally Robert B. Thompson & Hillary A. Sale, Securities Fraud as Corporate 
Governance: Reflections upon Federalism, 56 VAND. L. REV. 859, 872–86 (2003) and Mark J. 
Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588 (2003). 
 57. See, e.g., Arlen, supra note 6, at 834. For an early argument that corporate fraud is a 
type of agency cost, see Jennifer H. Arlen and William J. Carney, Vicarious Liability for Fraud 
on Securities Markets: Theory and Evidence, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 691, 701–03 (theorizing that 
officers and directors defraud markets to save their jobs, at the expense of corporate 
shareholders). For later analyses, see Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Mutiny by the Bounties? The 
Attempt to Reform Wall Street by the New Whistleblower Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act, 
2012 BYU L. REV. 73, 106 (quoting Rose, supra note 4, at 2182) (ascribing securities fraud to 
“opportunities” and “pressures” that are exacerbated by corporate agency costs).  
 58. Day traders, for example, may benefit from fraud insofar as they sell stock while it is 
inflated. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on 
Deterrence and Its Implementation, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1534, 1559–60 (2006) (discussing 
incipient conflict between professional traders and undiversified, “buy and hold” investors, 
who “are more likely to have purchased their stock before the class period commenced”). Buy 
and hold investors, however, are likely to suffer. Id. at 1560. Moreover, as Professor Alicia 
Davis Evans explains, the average investor loses more money on disclosed frauds than he gains 
from undisclosed frauds. Alicia Davis Evans, The Investor Compensation Fund, 33 J. CORP. L. 
223, 229 (2007). 
 59. Rose, supra note 4, at 2179–80 (explaining securities fraud’s effects on the stock 
market’s ability to reflect accurate prices and thus steer capital away from its most efficient 
use); see also James J. Park, Rule 10B-5 and the Rise of the Unjust Enrichment Principle, 60 
DUKE L.J. 345, 355–56 (2010) (citing literature discussing securities fraud’s allocative and 
informational effects). 
 60. For example, Professor Usha Rodrigues portrays corporate fraud as a conflict of 
interest problem: “Even as the Enron and Worldcom frauds gave way to fresher tales of options 
backdating, corporate looting, insider trading, and more recently out-sized golden parachutes, 
the common denominator remained the fact that corporate agents put their own interests above 
those of the corporation.” Rodrigues, supra note 5, at 3 (emphasis added). Others observe that 
corporate fraud victimizes stakeholders beyond those who meet the narrow legal definition of 
“principal.” See Urska Velikonja, The Cost of Securities Fraud, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1887, 
1945 (2013) (arguing that fraud affects economic decision-making among firms more broadly, 
not just shareholders in a specific corporation whose officers misstated earnings). 
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nondisclosures of conflicts of interests outside the boundaries of 
federal criminal law.61 Other conflicts of interest—such as those that 
arise in the merger context, where managers attempt to fend off 
takeovers partially to preserve their own positions—are the subject of 
state corporate law.62 Nevertheless, much of what we think of as 
opportunistic behavior within a firm (e.g., deceitful behavior that 
causes victims to lose tangible interests such as money) still rests 
comfortably within the criminal law paradigm.63  
B.  Deterring Opportunistic Behavior 
Since opportunistic agents are presumptively rational, their 
misconduct can be deterred.64 Deterrence, in turn, depends on the 
putative wrongdoer’s cost–benefit analysis.65 When the expected 
sanction for misconduct, multiplied by the probability of punishment, 
outweighs its net expected benefits, the would-be wrongdoer desists.66 
A separate strand of this literature recognizes that legal institutions 
can reduce wrongdoing by altering the wrongdoer’s preferences or 
tastes for engaging in wrongdoing.67 In either case, the law 
enforcement institution reduces fraud by adding to the would-be 
wrongdoer’s costs or by reducing his expected benefits.  
                                                                                                                    
 61. See Skilling v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2896, 2931–32 (2010) (limiting definition of 
“honest services fraud” statute to include only bribery and kickbacks, and not nondisclosure of 
conflicts of interests).  
 62. See, e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985) 
(discussing the “enhanced duty” that results because of the “omnipresent specter that a board 
may be acting primarily in its own interests, rather than those of the corporation and its 
shareholders”). 
 63. “A century ago, lying raised moral and reputational questions but only rarely legal 
ones. Today, lying by any government official or lying in the course of any business transaction 
is usually a felony.” William J. Stuntz, Self-Defeating Crimes, 86 VA. L. REV. 1871, 1881–82 
(2000). 
 64. See, e.g., Arlen & Carney, supra note 57, at 701–03. For more recent accounts of 
how fraud reflects as agency costs, see for example Harry First, Branch Office of the 
Prosecutor: The New Role of the Corporation in Business Crime Prosecutions, 89 N.C. L. REV. 
23 (2010) and Urska Velikonja, Leverage, Sanctions, and Deterrence of Accounting Fraud, 44 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1281 (2011).  
 65. For the seminal discussion of this point, see Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: 
An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169, 176–79 (1968) (explaining the “supply” of 
offenses) and Oded, supra note 25, at 273 (citing authorities). 
 66. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 51, 1205–14 (discussing the optimal criminal penalties 
to deter crime); Steven Shavell, Criminal Law and the Optimal Use of Nonmonetary Sanctions 
as a Deterrent, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1232, 1241–46 (1985) (noting that a party would not be 
“deterred from committing an act if his expected private benefits exceed the disutility of the 
highest conceivable expected sanction”). See generally Becker, supra note 65. 
 67. See Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, An Economic Analysis of the Criminal Law as a 
Preference-Shaping Policy, 1990 DUKE L.J. 1, 2 (setting forth “an economic analysis of 
criminal law as a preference-shaping policy”). 
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Although Professor Gary Becker’s seminal account of crime treats 
sanctions and enforcement probability as substitutes, subsequent 
deterrence theory scholarship has demonstrated that criminals pay 
greater attention to increases in probability of punishment than 
increases in sanctions.68 Moreover, punishment’s timing plays a big 
role in its overall effectiveness. Disutility that occurs in later periods 
is felt less keenly than disutility experienced immediately. 
Accordingly, the more remote a sanction is in terms of time, the more 
weakly it deters.69 
A different strand of deterrence theory recognizes the importance 
of the corporate firm. The firm functions as a mediating entity: it can 
either diffuse responsibility for wrongdoing, or it can aid external 
authorities through self-monitoring and reporting.70 Accordingly, as 
Professors Jennifer Arlen and Reinier Kraakman argue, the best way 
to reduce organizational wrongdoing is to create a two-tiered scheme 
of liability for organizations, whereby the organizations can earn 
reduced sanctions for their employees’ wrongdoing by monitoring 
and self-reporting misconduct to external authorities.71 Corporations 
that maintain robust compliance programs thus experience reduced 
penalties, whereas corporations that forego aggressive monitoring 
suffer more severe sanctions if they are caught.72 
As those familiar with the agency-cost literature well know, 
lawmakers and private individuals have devised numerous ways to 
reduce corporate agency costs.73 Nevertheless, the tools most 
associated with the reduction of corporate fraud are criminal and civil 
liability, with criminal liability increasingly seen as the more robust 
mechanism for addressing fraud and similar types of wrongdoing.74 
                                                                                                                    
68.  See Becker, supra note 65; see also Miriam H. Baer, Linkage and the Deterrence of 
Corporate Fraud, 94 VA. L. REV. 1295, 1303–06 & n.38 (offering reasons why increasing the 
probability of punishment may be more effective than increasing sanctions).  
69.  See generally Yair Listokin, Crime and (with a Lag) Punishment: The Implications of 
Discounting for Equitable Sentencing, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 115, 116 (2007). 
70.  See Samuel W. Buell, Criminal Procedure Within the Firm, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1613, 
1625–27 (2007). 
71.  See generally Jennifer Arlen & Reinier Kraakman, Controlling Corporate 
Misconduct: An Analysis of Corporate Liability Regimes, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 687 (1997); Arlen, 
supra note 6. 
72.  For an argument that the federal government has failed to effectively implement this 
two-tiered scheme, see generally Jennifer Arlen, The Failure of the Organizational Sentencing 
Guidelines, 66 U. MIAMI L. REV. 321 (2012). 
73.  Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 41, at 23–28 (dividing various approaches into 
ex ante and ex post “regulatory” and “governance” strategies). 
74.  For a comprehensive argument that civil liability fails to deter corporate fraud due to 
the shielding effects of director and officer liability insurance, see generally TOM BAKER & 
SEAN J. GRIFFITH, ENSURING CORPORATE MISCONDUCT: HOW LIABILITY INSURANCE 
UNDERMINES SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION (2010). For other critiques of civil liability, see 
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C.  Temporally Inconsistent Decision Makers 
Many, if not all of us, have experienced the phenomenon whereby 
at T0, we promise to take one course of action in the future, only to 
later reverse that course of action at T1, and then express regret at T2 
for not having adhered to our original plans. The decisions we claim 
that we will make later are not the actual choices we make when 
“later” arrives, and in many cases, we regret our failure to adhere to 
our original plans. Psychologists and behavioral economists have 
devised several explanations for this phenomenon, which are 
discussed below. 
1.  Hyperbolic Discounting 
The hyperobolic discounting literature theorizes that indivdiuals 
change their minds suddenly because they discount costs and benefits 
differently depending on how close a given time interval is to the 
present.75 If asked to choose between a slice of pizza at an earlier 
point in time and two slices just one hour later, a person feels 
differently about the hour-long waiting period (and the extra slice) if 
that period commences now or is slated to commence one week from 
now.76 Far-off tradeoffs are perceived differently from imminent 
ones.77 As a result, given the choice between a single slice of pizza at 
5:00 PM next Thursday or two slices at 6:00 PM, a student may very 
happily agree today to wait just one additional hour for an extra slice 
of pizza. When “next Thursday” becomes today, however, and a 
single slice is a mere five minutes away, she is apt to change her 
mind.  
                                                                                                                    
generally John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on Deterrence 
and Its Implementation, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1534 (2006); Renee M. Jones, Law, Norms, and 
the Breakdown of the Board: Promoting Accountability in Corporate Governance, 92 IOWA L. 
REV. 105 (2006). 
 75. See, e.g., Preface to CHOICE OVER TIME (George Loewenstein & Jon Elster eds., 
1992) (collecting papers on intertemporal choice); see also George Loewenstein & Richard H. 
Thaler, Anomalies: Intertemporal Choice, J. ECON. PERSP., Fall 1989, at 181, 182–83 (offering 
common examples of hyperbolic discounting). For more technical treatments, see generally 
David Laibson, Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting, 112 Q.J. ECON. 443 (1997) and R.H. 
Strotz, Myopia and Inconsistency in Dynamic Utility Maximization, 23 REV. ECON. STUD. 165 
(1956). 
 76. “When faced with a choice between an inferior early option and a superior later 
option, hyperbolic discounters will tend to prefer the later, superior option, when both are 
remote, but switch to a preference for the earlier, inferior option as both approach in time.” 
CHOICE OVER TIME, supra note 75, at xiii; see also Loewenstein & Thaler, supra note 75, at 
181–83 (explaining mathematical principles behind time inconsistency). 
77.  Scholars sometimes refer to this as “declining impatience” since impatience declines 
for more remote time periods. See Yusuke Kinari, Fumio Ohtake & Yoshiro Tsutsui, Time 
Discounting: Declining Impatience and Interval Effect, 39 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 87, 88 
(2009) (explaining usage of the term). 
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Psychologists and behavioral economists have labeled this 
phenomenon “hyperbolic discounting.”78 Conventional rational-actor 
models assume that individuals discount time exponentially, 
according to a stable “discount.”79 Thus, for the rational actor, it does 
not matter when the wait for two slices of pizza begins. Although she 
would prefer pizza now to pizza later (as any rational person would), 
she nevertheless assigns the same value to the one-hour wait (and to 
the extra slice of pizza), regardless of when that wait commences. 
Hyperbolic discounters, by contrast, impose a steeper discount on 
intervals that occur closest to the present than to intervals slated to 
occur in the future.80 As Professor Oren Bar-Gill explains, “[A]t a 
given point in time, t, a hyperbolic discounter heavily discounts costs 
and benefits that will materialize in the near future, at t+1, but assigns 
only a smaller additional discount for costs (and benefits) that will 
materialize in the more distant future, at t+2.”81  
Individuals who are unaware of this tendency incorrectly predict 
their future behavior.82 We think that we can wait an additional hour 
for a much-anticipated televised sporting event to begin, but when the 
additional hour arrives, the wait feels more costly, and as a result, we 
change our plans.83  
Hyperbolic discounting is particularly problematic for conduct that 
generates positive and negative consequences in different periods. 
True, even rational individuals judge immediate costs or benefits 
more strongly than equivalent costs or benefits that arise in later 
periods. But hyperbolic discounters place a much greater premium on 
near-term costs and benefits, which makes them more likely to put off 
(and ultimately abandon) activities that feature upfront costs, and to 
excessively and prematurely consume activities that feature upfront 
                                                                                                                    
 78. See Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to 
Law & Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1539–40 (1998) (contrasting hyperbolic 
discounting with exponential discounting); Ted O’Donoghue & Matthew Rabin, Doing It Now 
or Later, 89 AM. ECON. REV. 103, 106 n.7 (1999).  
 79. Wright & Ginsburg, supra note 11, at 1043. 
 80. “When considering trade-offs between two future moments, present-biased 
preferences give stronger relative weight to the earlier moment as it gets closer.” O’Donoghue 
& Rabin, supra note 78, at 103; see also Utset, Hyperbolic Criminals, supra note 18, at 641. 
 81. Oren Bar-Gill, Seduction By Plastic, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1373, 1396 (2004). 
 82. “When a hyperbolic discounter is naïve about the nature of her time preferences, she 
will overestimate her will-power . . . .” Id. at 81, at 1396 (explaining why consumers 
excessively borrow money); see also Utset, Hyperbolic Criminals, supra note 18, at 612. 
 83. Conduct changes when preferences change. Plotted on a graph, this is the moment 
that the individual’s future and present preference curves “cross.” “[D]iscount curves that cross 
as a function of time alone do not arise from the conventional, exponential form of 
discounting.” George Ainslie & Nick Haslam, Hyperbolic Discounting, in CHOICE OVER TIME, 
supra note 75, at 57, 63. For more on preference switches generally, see Korobkin & Ulen, 
supra note 13, at 1127–43. 
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benefits.84  
The hyperbolic discounting literature is concededly messy. Some 
disagree on when it occurs and others on how to model it.85 
Researchers have identified a stronger effect on discounts when the 
interval is framed as a delay of gains as opposed to a delay of losses, 
and the magnitude of the effect increases for smaller amounts.86 
Finally, some researchers argue that hyperbolic discounting does not 
accurately predict behavior beyond an initial interval, and therefore 
reflects little more than a visceral reaction.87  
One need not definitely resolve these debates, as most researchers 
agree that individuals harbor some type of immediacy bias, and that 
they alter their conduct in ways that conflict with their previously 
stated intentions.88 Regardless of whether we attribute this switch to 
hyperbolic discounting or other phenomena, the switch presents a 
problem for policymakers and law enforcers.89  
2.  Willpower and Self-Control Problems 
Many individuals discount hyperbolically, but not everyone acts in 
accordance with his or her altered preferences.90 Some people stick to 
their T0 plans, even at T1. We often say (quite approvingly) that these 
                                                                                                                    
 84. Utset, supra note 8, at 419 n.6, 420. 
 85. See, e.g., Shane Frederick & George Loewenstein, Conflicting Motives in 
Evaluations of Sequences, 37 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 221, 221–22 (2008) (acknowledging a 
lack of consensus among researchers). Professor Daniel Read argues that individuals are 
“subadditive” in that they impose smaller discounts on longer delays than they do on a sum of 
shorter delays. See Daniel Read, Is Time-Discounting Hyperbolic or Subadditive?, 23 J. RISK & 
UNCERTAINTY 5 (2001) (demonstrating through experiments that declining discounts are due 
solely to subadditivity and not hyperbolic discounting). In response, researchers contend that 
Read failed to test for hyperbolic discounting over shorter delays. See Kinari et al., supra note 
77 (isolating “interval” and “delay” effects and demonstrating “hyperbolic discounting” for 
shorter delays while also establishing subadditivity for longer delays). 
 86. Loewenstein & Thaler, supra note 75, at 184. 
 87. Read, supra note 85, at 28 (arguing that “[a]n immediacy effect is not declining 
impatience, but rather a one-time-only charge for delaying consumption”). Read further argues 
that hyperbolic preferences respond mostly to “visceral” emotions, such as hunger, and that the 
use of money in his experiments was proper because money “may have some visceral 
properties, [but] this is not its primary characteristic.” Id. at 27. 
 88. As Professors Fennell and Stark argue, “While there may be questions about how 
well the hyperbolic discount function tracks the dynamics of preference reversals, it usefully 
captures the idea that lack of self-control can undo previously preferred plans . . . .” Lee Anne 
Fennell & Kirk J. Stark, Taxation over Time, 59 TAX L. REV. 1, 14–15 (2005) (footnote 
omitted). 
 89. Jolls et al., supra note 78, at 1539–40 (discussing the implication of hyperbolic 
discounting for “effective deterrence of criminal behavior”). 
 90. Fennell, Willpower Taxes, supra note 12, at 1378 (observing that although hyperbolic 
discounting is often “symptomatic” of willpower lapses, the phenomenon does not “inevitably 
signify” such lapses). 
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individuals possess substantial willpower.91 Professor Lee Anne 
Fennell defines this elusive ability as “one’s personal efficacy in 
carrying out the consumption path that one (from a cool, reflective, 
composite, or long-run perspective) deems to be the best of those that 
lie open.”92  
People who are unable to adhere to their long-term plans are often 
said to lack self-control.93 As Professor Richard McAdams and 
Professor Fennell have (separately) pointed out, the naïve person who 
lacks self-control in a particular moment differs significantly from the 
myopic individual who maintains a uniformly high discount rate.94 
The myopic person does not burden herself with long-term plans and 
therefore experiences no regret when she changes her mind.95 The 
hyperbolic person, by contrast, sincerely embarks upon beneficial, 
long-term projects, but later abandons them when temptations 
overwhelm her.96 Unlike her impulsive friend, the hyperbolic 
individual desires and assumes she will behave like the dependable 
person with the relatively low discount rate, but for some reason, she 
loses the ability to do so when changes in utility become imminent.97  
Aside from hyperbolic discounting and willpower lapses, 
researchers have posed additional explanations for preference 
switching. The study of emotions has led some to adopt a “hot and 
cold” explanation of behavior. The “cold state” can dispassionately 
calculate and net out long-term costs and benefits, whereas the “hot 
state” abandons this rational framework.98 As a result, the cold, 
rational self chooses a long-term option that yields long-term benefits. 
The hot, emotional self undoes the cold self’s plans, causing regret 
(and often serious costs) later on.99 And, as is the case with hyperbolic 
discounting, the cold self underestimates the likelihood and effect that 
his emotions will cause him to make poor decisions at some later 
                                                                                                                    
 91. For an extended treatment of the subject and summary of Roy Baumeister’s and other 
psychologists’ studies on willpower, see generally ROY F. BAUMEISTER & JOHN TIERNEY, 
WILLPOWER (2011). 
 92. Fennell, Willpower Taxes, supra note 12, at 1376–77 (footnote omitted). 
 93. Id. at 1377 (observing that “willpower relates to individuals’ subjective optimization 
efforts”).  
 94. Id. at 1378–79; McAdams, Signaling, supra note 18, at 657. 
 95. See McAdams, Signaling, supra note 18, at 656 (observing that feelings of regret will 
be felt solely by the persons with inconsistent discount rates and not those with uniformly high 
discount rates). 
 96. See Fennell, Willpower Taxes, supra note 12, at 1378–79. 
 97. See id. 
 98. George Loewenstein, Emotions in Economic Theory and Economic Behavior, 90 AM. 
ECON. REV. (PAPERS & PROC.) 426, 428 (2000) (“[V]isceral factors often drive people to behave 
in ways that they view as contrary to their own self-interest.”). For a detailed account of how 
hot and cold states impact decision-making, see Hollander-Blumoff, supra note 18, at 527–29. 
 99. See Loewenstein, supra note 98, at 428. 
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point in time.100  
Finally, Professor Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff’s recent discussion 
of construal-level theory offers a slightly different explanation for 
preference switches.101 According to this theory, an individual 
estimates the costs or benefits of a far-off event differently depending 
on whether she views the event “abstractly” in the future (high-level 
construal) or “concretely” in the present (low-level construal).102 As 
the event becomes more imminent, costs or benefits of a given 
activity appear more acute.103 As Professor Hollander-Blumoff’s 
account demonstrates, the concrete, near-term calculation is not 
necessarily more accurate; it is simply felt more strongly.104 
Construal-level theory thus explains why an individual might commit 
to a goal or obligation, later decide that it is too onerous, and yet feel 
regret afterward when she fails to follow through on her original 
plan.105  
Whether the explanation revolves around willpower lapses, hot 
and cold states, or abstract and concrete reasoning, the outcome is the 
same: people desire certain long-term commitments, and then view 
the associated costs and benefits of those commitments differently as 
decisions move from the future to the present. As a result, they act in 
ways they would not have predicted in the past, and then experience 
regret once they change course.  
D.  Reducing Temporal Inconsistency 
The temporal inconsistency literature identifies primarily two 
types of problems, procrastination and excessive or premature 
consumption.106 As Professors Ted O’Donoghue and Matthew Rabin 
explain: “You procrastinate—wait when you should do it—if actions 
involve immediate costs (writing a paper), and preoperate—do it 
                                                                                                                    
 100. “[P]eople tend to underestimate the impact of visceral factors on their own current 
and future behavior.” Id. “When in a ‘cold’ state . . . , it is difficult to imagine what it would 
feel like to be in a ‘hot’ state or to imagine how one might behave in such a state [and vice 
versa].” Id. 
 101. Hollander-Blumoff, supra note 18, at 529–33. 
 102. Id. at 529–30. 
 103. Id. at 530 (“[L]ow-level construals capture the concrete, specific, mundane features 
of the event.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 104. See id. at 530 (noting that high-level, abstract construal “helps individuals exercise 
self-control”). 
 105. See id. at 532 (explaining that “the events are not just weighted [differently], they are 
also conceptualized differently”). 
 106. See Utset, Hyperbolic Criminals, supra note 18, at 644–45 (discussing how 
procrastination and overconsumption can generate crime). Some might ask what the difference 
is between the procrastinator and the person who wholly abandons the project. The 
procrastinator still thinks she will eventually do the project even though she keeps putting it 
off. 
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when you should wait—if actions involve immediate rewards . . . .”107 
Both types of conduct impose costs on individuals and third parties. 
Professor Manuel Utset applies these concepts to the corporate 
context and argues that a temporally inconsistent corporate manager 
may either procrastinate engaging in valuable projects or otherwise 
“overconsume” misbehavior.108 The tendency to procrastinate and 
overconsume, in turn, generates corporate wrongdoing, by serving as 
either the cause of corporate wrongdoing or as the condition that 
precedes such wrongdoing.109  
Consider the evils of procrastination: Kathy, a regional district 
manager, agrees to meet a sales target set by her supervisor. She must 
meet that target by next month, and to achieve that target, she agrees 
that she should reorganize her sales team. But the reorganization, 
which she previously agreed was necessary and valuable, requires an 
upfront investment in time and social capital. Accordingly, every day, 
Kathy puts off her planned reorganization; she plans to do it 
eventually, but she cannot bring herself to do it “today.” At the end of 
the month, Kathy has no choice but to lie or accept a negative 
performance review. If Kathy chooses to lie, we can say that 
procrastination has played a role in her fraud.  
Now consider the evils of overconsumption: Jennifer, a corporate 
compliance officer, suspects the IT group of filing fraudulent expense 
reports. When she questions the top Chief Information Officer, he 
provides her with superficially plausible explanations for his group’s 
previous reports. Jennifer ought to spend time investigating and 
questioning the reports, but the immediate benefits of closing out her 
investigation appear too tempting. As a result she accepts the CIO’s 
explanation without a follow-up. Jennifer has effectively 
“overconsumed” an immediate benefit.  
The temporal inconsistency literature contends that we can solve 
the foregoing problems by enacting so-called precommitment devices, 
which have been defined as “any action by which the present self 
constrains the choices of the future self.”110 One can do this either by 
                                                                                                                    
 107. O’Donoghue & Rabin, supra note 78, at 104.  
 108. Presumably, a hyperbolic person could harm his longer-term self by either premature 
consumption or excessive consumption. Compare id., with Utset, Hyberbolic Criminals, supra 
note 18. Utset refers to the latter as a form of “nibbling opportunism,” but for reasons set out 
later, this Article prefers to treat the term “opportunistic” as referring to one’s motivation, 
which is separate from one’s tendency to be consistent or inconsistent. Compare Utset, 
Hyperbolic Criminals, supra note 18, at 644, with infra Part II. 
 109. Utset, supra note 8, at 432–36 (explaining how temporal inconsistency affects both 
corporate managers and those “gatekeepers” tasked with monitoring said managers).  
 110. McAdams, Signaling, supra note 18, at 657. Professor Stephen Bainbridge sets forth 
four “precommitment” strategies, which include the deletion of options, increasing the costs of 
choosing certain options, delays or cooling-off periods, and insulation from knowledge of 
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creating mechanisms that accelerate costs and benefits the very 
moment the decision maker is apt to yield to her short-term 
temptations, or by implementing devices that explicitly reduce 
options in advance of a foreseen event.111 A tool that falls within the 
former category is a “targeted enforcement device,” and a tool that 
falls within the latter category is an “option-reducing device.”  
Targeted enforcement devices increase the costs of undesirable 
behavior either by accelerating sanctions or delaying gratification.112 
Unlike ordinary deterrence devices, they impose an external cost or 
benefit at exactly the moment an individual is likely to fall prey to 
short-term temptations. A nice example is the speed bump; the reason 
it stops a driver from speeding is that it forces him to experience the 
“costs” of speeding at the very moment he is tempted to place his foot 
on the accelerator.113 By the same token, if every time a company 
executive wants to take a government client out to dinner, the 
executive has to describe the existence and purpose of the dinner in a 
memo and demonstrate why it does not violate state or local 
procurement laws; the mere fact of having to write the memo imposes 
an immediate “cost” on the executive’s behavior. In the moment, she 
may not care about being fired or placed in jail months down the road, 
but she may so dislike filling out paperwork (or worse, conferring 
with her supervisor) that she is deflected from engaging in violations 
of bribery and gratuity laws. The accelerated cost (writing a memo) is 
more effective than the longer-term cost (being detected and sent to 
prison).  
The same internal reporting system also makes it easier to track or 
prove violations ex post if the employee lies about the purpose of the 
dinner, or fails to fill out the memo at all. Thus, a targeted 
enforcement device fulfills two functions. It triggers an early 
“nonsanction cost” that may deflect an otherwise waffling employee 
from falling prey to some short-term desire to bribe a potential 
                                                                                                                    
certain options. Bainbridge, supra note 17, at 4–5. Professor John Robertson similarly 
describes precommitment devices that work by “removing certain options from the feasible 
[decision] set, by making them more costly or available only with a delay, and by insulating 
themselves from knowledge about their existence.” Robertson, supra note 16, at 1730 (quoting 
JOHN ELSTER, ULYSSES UNBOUND: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY, PRECOMMITTMENT, AND 
CONTRAINTS 1 (2000)). 
 111. Professor Utset notes that certain provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 were 
intended to perform these functions. Utset, supra note 8, at 439–43. 
 112. See, e.g., Utset, Hyperbolic Criminals, supra note 18, at 657–62 (arguing in favor of 
“well-tailored” deterrence approaches that target first-period costs and benefits).  
 113. See Leandra Lederman, Statutory Speed Bumps: The Roles Third Parties Play in Tax 
Compliance, 60 STAN. L. REV. 695, 696 (2007) (praising the speed bump’s qualities in 
constraining speeding). 
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government client.114 At the same time, it increases the costs of 
engaging in criminal conduct for all employees because it increases 
the overall likelihood of detection and punishment. The employee 
who was planning all along to obtain a government contract through 
bribery now must fill out fraudulent paperwork to mask his 
behavior.115 Such detection avoidance is costly, even if only 
marginally so, and may trigger a separate, independent punishment 
for false disclosure.116  
Another source of targeted enforcement is the psychic cost that an 
individual feels at the moment he is about to falsify records or commit 
other types of wrongdoing. Criminologists have demonstrated that 
moral inhibitions play a role in reducing crime, including corporate 
crime.117 Psychic costs, in turn, arise out of social norms.118  
If every time an individual falsifies a document, he feels a sudden 
wave of unpleasant emotions (e.g., fear or shame), he will more likely 
avoid such behavior.119 The “self-imposed” sanction works not just 
because it increases the overall cost of wrongdoing, but also because 
                                                                                                                    
 114. McAdams, supra note 18, at 1613 (using the term “nonsanction cost” to denote costs 
taken by potential criminals in preparing for crime to “lower the probability of detection”). 
 115. Cf. id. at 1616 (noting that when a “criminal must invest in the crime” before any 
benefits accrue, “sanctions for criminal preparation will cause criminals to incur extra costs in 
making their preparation to avoid detection”). 
 116. See id.; Chris William Sanchirico, Detection Avoidance, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1331, 
1378–82 (2006) (discussing “piggyback” sanctions employed to punish detected instances of 
detection avoidance). Concededly, detection avoidance may be costly to the government 
enforcer as well as the offender. Id. at 1353. 
117. See Nicole Leeper Piquero, M. Lyn Exum & Sally S. Simpson, Integrating the 
Desire-for-Control and Rational Choice in a Corporate Crime Context, 22 JUST. Q. 252, 254 
(2005) (citing studies for the proposition that “moral inhibitions consistently have inhibitory 
effects on crime”); see also Raymond Paternoster & Sally S. Simpson, Sanction Threats and 
Appeals to Morality: Testing a Rational Choice Model of Corporate Crime, 30 LAW & SOC’Y 
REV. 549, 554 (1996). 
 118. “Social norms are standards of behavior that are based on widely shared beliefs about 
how individual group members ought to behave in a given situation.” Helen Bernhard et al., 
Group Affiliation and Altruistic Norm Enforcement, 96 AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS & PROC.) 217, 
217 (2006); see also J. Mark Ramseyer, The Costs of the Consensual Myth: Antitrust 
Enforcement and Institutional Barriers to Litigation in Japan, 94 YALE L.J. 604, 644 (1985) 
(describing psychic costs incident to behaving contrary to social norms). 
 119. See Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in 
Criminal Law, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 269, 355–57 (1996) (noting that individuals internalize 
social norms expressed in criminal laws to avoid discomfort and dissonance associated with 
desires to commit violations of such laws). Norms can either be imposed internally (through 
conscience or guilt) or externally (through reputational or societal sanction). See Robert D. 
Cooter, Three Effects of Social Norms on Law: Expression, Deterrence, and Internalization, 79 
OR. L. REV. 1, 6–8 (2000) (discussing the relationship between internalized norms and external 
social sanctions); Kahan & Nussbaum, supra, at 356–57. For a study of psychic costs and their 
relationship with corruption, see Philip M. Nichols, The Psychic Costs of Violating Corruption 
Laws, 45 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 145, 193–95, 198–200 (2012). 
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it surfaces at exactly the moment the individual considers engaging in 
wrongdoing, and effectively deflects his short-term temptation.120  
Temporal inconsistency theory thus provides an additional 
explanation for how “norms” improve compliance.121 The regulated 
person follows the law not just because she agrees with the law’s 
content and finds the lawmaker’s authority “legitimate,”122 but also 
because the norm triggers a strong psychic cost—guilt or shame—at 
exactly the right time. Certainly, legitimacy matters, but the reason 
why it matters is likely bound up with its timing.  The psychic cost 
behaves like an internal speed bump and deflects the individual’s 
short-term temptation to engage in wrongdoing.123  
The second type of precommitment device is one that reduces an 
individual’s options in advance of a foreseen event.  Whereas targeted 
enforcement technically leaves intact the option of behaving badly, 
option-reducing devices eliminate such discretion.124 They do so 
either by removing options or by blocking access to the information 
that would cause a decision maker to choose such options.125  
The most celebrated example is that of Ulysses, who famously 
directed his crewmen to tie him to the mast of his ship and plugged 
their ears with wax so that they would not hear his cries when he 
heard the Sirens’ song.126 As a result, he and his crewmembers were, 
respectively, unable and unaware of any reason to steer the ship in the 
                                                                                                                    
 120. See Robert D. Cooter, Decentralized Law for a Complex Economy: The Structural 
Approach to Adjudicating the New Law Merchant, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1643, 1665 (1996) 
(“[S]omeone who has internalized a norm feels guilt from violating it and pride from obeying 
it. Consequently, internalization may tip the balance for a decisionmaker in favor of obeying a 
norm.” (footnote omitted)); Richard H. McAdams, Group Norms, Gossip, and Blackmail, 144 
U. PA. L. REV. 2237, 2249–50 (1996) (similar). That being said, an individual may convince 
himself that certain behavior, however illegal, does not violate any social norms. See Rapp, 
supra note 57, at 106; see also Haugh, supra note 40 (manuscript at 26–34) (drawing on 
criminological scholarship regarding “neutralization techniques” that defendants use to assure 
themselves that they are not violating social norms). 
 121. “Normative commitment through personal morality means obeying a law because 
one feels the law is just; normative commitment through legitimacy means obeying a law 
because one feels that the authority enforcing the law has the right to dictate behavior.” TOM R. 
TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 4 (2006).  
 122. Id. 
 123. Temporal inconsistency thus may offer researchers additional avenues through which 
to test the relative power of social norms as a deterrent. 
 124. See Bainbridge, supra note 17, at 2 (“[S]elf-disablement is a critical aspect of any 
precommitment strategy.”). 
 125. Id. at 4 (noting the benefits of self-imposed ignorance). 
 126. 1 HOMER, supra note 16, at 445, 447. The device permitted Ulysses to have his cake 
and eat it too: “Ulysses clogged the ears of his crew with wax so they would not respond to 
songs of the deadly Sirens, but ordered himself bound to the mast so he could enjoy them 
without physical power to stray from his predetermined course.” Adam M. Samaha, Dead 
Hand Arguments and Constitutional Interpretation, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 606, 655–56 (2008). 
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Sirens’ direction.  
Option-reducing devices are valuable precisely because a decision 
maker or some other entity can design them to respond to specific 
temptations.127 Option-reducing devices can exclude numerous 
options or just a few, and they can exclude options irrevocably or 
conditionally. They can extinguish options through technology (such 
as a self-shutting engine) or they can delegate the option to some third 
party who is less likely to fall prey to temptation (such as having an 
employer pay a portion of his employee’s taxes).128 
The line between an option-reducing device and a targeted 
enforcement device is admittedly hazy, particularly since many 
option-reducing devices do not completely eliminate options, but 
instead make them extremely costly or difficult to achieve. Still, one 
can grasp the conceptual difference between a speed bump and the act 
of tying oneself to a ship’s mast. The former makes speeding more 
uncomfortable; the latter all but eliminates the possibility of steering 
one’s ship in a particular direction. 
Both types of precommitment devices appear frequently 
throughout public and private life.129 The U.S. Constitution has been 
described as a precommitment device, as has the standard corporate 
charter, the Social Security payroll tax, and the Christmas savings 
club.130 All of these mechanisms reduce or vastly circumscribe certain 
options in advance of a foreseen event. Some precommitment devices 
are difficult to undo (such as bariatric surgery) and some are 
relatively weak (such as annual gym memberships).131  
Although the precommitment device presumes a level of “self” 
commitment, the concept has been slowly expanded to include 
devices that entities and government agencies impose on others. The 
least objectionable device is one that an individual imposes on 
himself with the stated intention of helping only himself.132  
                                                                                                                    
 127. Bainbridge, supra note 17, at 2 (providing examples). 
 128. Lederman, supra note 113, at 697−98, 723−25 (discussing compliance benefits of tax 
withholding).  
129. For illustrative examples, see Daniel Akst, Commit Yourself, REASON.COM (May 
2011), http://reason.com/archives/2011/04/18/commit-yourself. 
 130. See Susannah Camic, Earmarking: The Potential Benefits, 4 PITTSBURGH TAX REV. 
55, 64 (2006) (Social Security and Medicare); Michael C. Dorf, The Aspirational Constitution, 
77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1631, 1637–44 (2009) (the Constitution and Bill of Rights); Samuel 
Issacharoff & Daniel R. Ortiz, Governing Through Intermediaries, 85 VA. L. REV. 1627, 1640 
(1999) (corporate charters); Deborah M. Weiss, Paternalistic Pension Policy: Psychological 
Evidence and Economic Theory, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1275, 1307–08 (1991) (Christmas clubs). 
 131. Memberships are a weak device because members can still decide to stay home, 
despite paying money in advance for gym classes. See Stefano DellaVigna & Ulrike 
Malmendier, Paying Not to Go to the Gym, 96 AM. ECON. REV. 694, 695 (2006) (theorizing 
that consumers overestimate their future self-control in pursuing costly activities). 
 132. McAdams explicitly refers to self-commitment devices. McAdams, Signaling, supra 
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One can also adopt a precommitment device with the express 
intention of benefitting others. Professor Bainbridge refers to these as 
“other-regarding” devices.133 If a housing contractor agrees that he 
will reduce his overall fee if he completes the job after a certain date, 
he has effectively committed himself to finishing the job on or before 
that date.134 Precommitments like these are unsurprisingly common 
throughout contract, commercial, and corporate law.135 If a corporate 
officer binds himself in advance to provide shareholders with 
quarterly and annual reports about the company’s performance, his 
commitment intentionally aids others and presumably redounds to his 
long-term benefit as well.136  
Many of the legal regulations that scholars praise as “structural” 
also function in the same way as precommitment devices.137 
“Structure” eliminates the option to defect or engage in socially costly 
behavior down the road.138 As Professor Edward Cheng explains, 
structure prevails by “subtly shaping the physical, social, or other 
arrangements that enable the behavior to occur in the first place.”139 
The difference between the traditional precommitment device and 
structural regulation, however, is that in the latter case, a government 
agency designs and implements the structure (albeit in some instances 
with the public’s backing).140 When government agents are the 
                                                                                                                    
note 18, at 656−58. Bainbridge refers to them as “self-regarding precommitments.” Bainbridge, 
supra note 17, at 5. 
 133. Bainbridge, supra note 17, at 5−6. 
 134. The contractor may also place such a term in the contract to signal that he takes 
deadlines seriously. 
 135. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 17, at 2–3, 22–25 (offering examples in corporate 
and commercial law).  
 136. Professor Coffee explains that securities disclosure and the decision to place one’s 
corporation on a public exchange acts as a “bonding” device. John C. Coffee, Jr., Law and the 
Market: The Impact of Enforcement, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 229, 285 (2007) (citing John C. 
Coffee, Jr., The Future as History: The Prospects for Global Convergence in Corporate 
Governance and Its Implications, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 641, 691–92 (1999)) (“[M]anagers bond[] 
themselves not to accumulate excessive private benefits by deliberately subjecting themselves 
to a stricter regulatory regime . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)). As this Article’s 
analysis demonstrates, the temporal inconsistency literature adds an additional gloss: the 
federal securities laws’ disclosure requirements not only “bond” the agent to his principal, but 
also precommit the corporate agent to a desirable course of conduct.  
 137. “Unlike fiat, structure does not regulate undesired behavior directly through ex post 
penalties. Rather, it regulates indirectly and ex ante by subtly shaping the physical, social, or 
other arrangements that enable the behavior to occur in the first place. Its philosophy is more 
preventive than reactive.” Edward K. Cheng, Structural Laws and the Puzzle of Regulating 
Behavior, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 655, 662 (2006); see also Lederman, supra note 113, at 696. 
 138. Cheng, supra note 137, at 662. 
139. Id. at 655, 662; see also Lederman, supra note 113, at 697. 
 140. “[A] lawmaker can provide cost-effective deterrence by mimicking the commitment 
devices that sophisticated offenders would adopt for themselves.” Utset, Hyperbolic Criminals, 
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authors of  precommitment devices, new concerns arise. 
For libertarians, the difference between the self-imposed or 
government-imposed device is of tremendous significance, since 
government incursions on decision-making implicate, as Professor 
Michael Rich observes, “concerns about autonomy, privacy, and 
bodily integrity.”141 For technocrats interested in improving social 
welfare, the device’s success and net cost are of more interest, 
although it seems likely that precommitment’s success depends in part 
on its source.142  
The libertarian critique that government ought not intervene to 
protect the “long-term” self’s interest weakens considerably when one 
narrows the focus to corporate fraud. The corporate enforcer’s task is 
not to reduce all temporally inconsistent behavior, but rather that type 
of behavior that society has already declared undesirable through 
democratically enacted statutes and regulations.143 To the extent that 
an individual’s short-term self (who prefers to lie and steal) is at war 
with her long-term self (who prefers to abide by the law), there is no 
contest. The short-term self is clearly out of order; society has already 
made that clear.144 At that point, the state has every reason to get 
involved. 
II.  HOW OPPORTUNISM AND TEMPORAL INCONSISTENCY INTERACT 
Some people are more inclined to take advantage of others through 
                                                                                                                    
supra note 18, at 677. “Although one usually thinks about precommitment from an 
individualist perspective, the term is also usefully applied to group, societal, or national 
decisions.” Robertson, supra note 16, at 1732. 
 141. Michael L. Rich, Should We Make Crime Impossible?, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
795, 802 (2013) (discussing the philosophical importance of government involvement in 
structural criminal regulation); accord Cheng, supra note 137, at 669 (“The involuntary nature 
of structural regulation raises objections of excessive government control, reduced liberty, and 
invasions of privacy.”). 
 142. Compare Michael Abramowicz & Ian Ayres, Commitment Bonds, 100 GEO. L.J. 605 
(2012) (exploring the economic uses of government and privately issued commitment bonds), 
with Rich, supra note 141, at 800–01 (citing specific concerns with government-imposed 
structural regulations).  
 143. Concededly, neither courts nor legislatures have defined terms like “fraud” with 
adequate precision. See generally Buell, supra note 34. 
 144. However, society may not desire the government to punish all conduct that is 
described as criminal. See, e.g., Rich, supra note 141, at 810 (noting that societal perspectives 
on crime detection and punishment vary depending on the crime at issue); Josh Bowers, Legal 
Guilt, Normative Innocence, and the Equitable Decision Not to Prosecute, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 
1655, 1658–59 (2010) (“Most people anticipate something approximating categorical 
enforcement of very serious felonies but anticipate nonenforcement of some nontrivial number 
of petty crime incidents.” (footnote omitted)). Accordingly, the presence of precommitment 
devices places on the legislature greater pressure to clarify ex ante which behavior is legally 
acceptable. 
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deceptive and illegal means, and some are more likely to fall prey to 
their short-term desires. How might the combination of these 
dispositions within a single person—much less a single 
organization—affect the likelihood of corporate fraud?  
This Part explores the above question by examining the interaction 
between opportunism and temporal inconsistency. Section A briefly 
reviews the characteristics that render corporations prone to 
opportunistic and temporally inconsistent misconduct. Section B then 
models their interaction, generating a typology of corporate 
employees who present differing degrees of risk (and value) to the 
corporation.  
A.  The Corporate Firm as a Locus of Misconduct 
Opportunism and temporal inconsistency thrive under similar 
conditions. They are particularly likely to arise in organizations that: 
(1) grant officers and employees wide discretion, (2) shield decision 
makers’ processes from external review, and (3) embrace objectives 
that are complex enough to divide costs and benefits into different 
time periods. Individually and taken as a whole, these conditions 
increase the likelihood of both opportunistic and temporally 
inconsistent behavior. Not surprisingly, these conditions are prevalent 
within corporations. 
Corporate firms vest a number of their employees with increasing 
levels of discretion. Discretion can be quite valuable to the firm as it 
enables innovation and quick thinking.145 It may also attract more 
intelligent, devoted employees.146 Nevertheless, discretion has its 
drawbacks. It enables an agent to ignore her principal’s interests and 
instead serve her own.147 Moreover, with discretion comes temptation 
and a surfeit of options, all of which enable the decision maker to 
eschew her long-term interests for short-term pleasures.148  
By the same token, both sets of problems arise when organizations 
are opaque.149 Within large and even mid-size corporations, 
                                                                                                                    
 145. See Nils Stieglitz & Klaus Heine, Innovations and the Role of Complementarities in a 
Strategic Theory of the Firm, 28 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 1, 7–8 (2007). 
 146. Catherine E. Ross & Barbara F. Reskin, Education, Control at Work, and Job 
Satisfaction, 21 SOC. SCI. RES. 134, 139 (1992) (finding that “education is linked to 
significantly less routine work, [and] significantly more job autonomy”). 
 147. Thomas L. Carson, Self-Interest and Business Ethics: Some Lessons of the Recent 
Corporate Scandals, 43 J. BUS. ETHICS 389, 391 (2003) (“In the case of high-ranking business 
executives, discretion to do good is also discretion to do bad.”). 
 148. Id. 
 149. “Private organizations are relatively opaque, the more so the larger and more 
sophisticated they are. Layers of hierarchy must be penetrated to reach principal actors. 
Division of labor makes ascription of responsibility for conduct and results challenging.” Buell, 
supra note 70, at 1625. 
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responsibility and accountability fragment among and between 
different groups and hierarchies.150 Agents can more easily deceive 
principals, and temporally inconsistent individuals are more likely to 
yield to temptation. When no one else is looking, one can more easily 
steal from the petty cash account, cook the books, or eat the cookie on 
someone else’s desk.  
Finally, both sets of problems arise when decision makers reside in 
a world in which benefits and costs emerge over different time 
periods. The child who refuses to eat his broccoli at supper learns 
quite quickly that he will suffer immediate costs in the form of 
foregone dessert and reduced access to television. Organizational 
decision-making, by contrast, inherently plays out over multiple time 
periods, thereby weakening the feedback loop the corporate officer 
experiences in response to his wrongful behavior.151  
Within the corporate firm, the decision an employee makes today 
(good or bad) may not produce consequences for months or even 
years. Similarly, fraud and corruption rarely trigger immediate 
sanctions, in part because they occur in the context of projects that 
unspool over a period of months or years. As Professor Utset himself 
points out, criminal conduct often involves “a series of intertemporal 
decisions. An offender must plan and execute the crime, and will have 
to take steps to avoid detection after the fact.”152 Accordingly, 
benefits and costs are almost always skewed across different time 
periods. Successive time periods create problems for the rational and 
hyperbolic alike: they enable corporate agents the time and 
opportunity necessary to deceive unknowing principals, and they 
tempt short-term selves sufficiently to disrupt and disable long-term 
plans.  
B.  Theorizing the Interaction 
Imagine a world in which individuals occupy different points on 
two spectra. We might depict these two spectra as follows: 
                                                                                                                    
 150. See, e.g., ROBERT JACKALL, MORAL MAZES: THE WORLD OF CORPORATE MANAGERS 
17–18 (1988) (describing both the centralization and decentralization of authority and 
responsibility within corporations); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Participatory Management Within 
a Theory of the Firm, 21 J. CORP. L. 657, 669–71 (1996) (describing “branching hierarchies” 
within large public organizations that divide, specialize, and delegate authority and 
responsibility). 
 151. See Robert A. Prentice, The Case of the Irrational Auditor: A Behavioral Insight into 
Securities Fraud Litigation, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 133, 176–79 (2000) (discussing intertemporal 
“time-delay traps” that arise within corporations); cf. Buell, supra note 70, at 1627 (referring to 
the “slow ripening” of criminal liability within corporate firms). 
152. Manuel A. Utset, Inchoate Crimes Revisited: A Behavioral Economic Perspective, 47 
U. RICH. L. REV. 1205, 1206 (2013). 
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The bottom line, which we might label the “motivational 
spectrum,” measures an individual’s intentions. For purposes of 
simplicity, this Article assumes these intentions are “net” intentions, 
in light of any applicable rules, social norms, or cognitive biases. 
When all is said and done, some individuals are more motivated than 
others to do harm and some are more motivated than others to do 
good. This indeed remains one of the key challenges for any corporate 
enforcer: within the corporation, despite efforts designed to assure the 
contrary, some agents seek to do great deeds, whereas others 
affirmatively desire harm.  
To the extent an agent falls on the faithful, “good” end of the 
spectrum, her devotion to her principal may arise because she is 
inherently well-motived, because she happens to employ a relatively 
low discount rate, or because her interests are well-aligned by pre-
existing legal, economic, and social institutions.153 Regardless, our 
well-motivated agent seeks to achieve the short- and long-term goals 
that she believes her principal desires. Although she may harm her 
principal through mistake or accident, the costs of her mistakes are 
relatively low compared to those costs that arise from intentional 
misconduct. As a result, society can rely primarily on markets and 
contractual protections to address these basic competence issues.  
At the other end of this motivational spectrum is the pure 
opportunist. Unlike the well-motivated agent, the opportunist seeks 
solely to benefit himself, often at the expense of his principal. For 
purposes of this analysis, it is irrelevant whether the opportunist takes 
perverse pleasure in denying his principal’s wishes, or simply exploits 
weaknesses in institutions. Under either scenario, the opportunist 
knowingly engages in a course of conduct that harms his principal. 
                                                                                                                    
 153. Accordingly, this Article assumes that an individual’s “net motivation” takes into 
account various factors such as organization’s culture and its enforcement regime’s perceived 
legitimacy among its employees. See, e.g., Tom R. Tyler, Legitimacy and Criminal Justice: 
The Benefits of Self-Regulation, 7 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 307, 319–20 (2009) (summarizing the 
procedural justice model for securing individuals’ voluntary compliance with the law). 
Motivations 
Consistency 
Hyperbolic 
Faithful Opportunistic 
Temporally consistent 
Figure 1: Two Spectra 
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More importantly, because our opportunist knows he is acting in 
contravention of his principal’s wishes, he undertakes a number of 
measures to obscure the nature of his actions. It is this effort to cover 
one’s tracks that evokes Oliver Williamson’s famous definition of 
opportunism: self-interest seeking with guile.154  
Presumably, most individuals fall somewhere on the middle of this 
motivational spectrum and move around depending on the legal and 
social institutions involved. Much of the deterrence and agency-cost 
literature represents an attempt to devise and identify those 
mechanisms that most effectively move individuals from the “bad” 
(undesirable) end of the spectrum to good side, and to expel from 
business organizations (and society itself) those individuals who 
remain at the opportunistic end, despite all these efforts.  
The other spectrum in Figure 1 reflects an individual’s temporal 
consistency. Individuals who harbor different motivations also harbor 
different perceptions of costs and benefits as time unfolds. At the far 
end of this spectrum are those who consistently and pathologically 
favor long-term payoffs.155 These individuals are hyperopic in that 
they pathologically avoid immediate gratification.156 Although 
hyperopia may well impose costs on society, fraud is not likely to be 
among them. People who pathologically worry about the long-term 
(which ought to include fines and prison sentences) are not likely to 
engage in serious illegal conduct. 
The more important group, located in the middle of the spectrum, 
is the one that either “naturally” maintains stable preferences or has 
external methods to create this type of stability.157 Even among this 
group, we may find individuals who maintain consistently high 
discount rates and therefore seek immediate gratification.158 In the 
corporate context, however, this is unlikely, as most corporate 
employees have attained significant levels of education and 
employment success. One cannot achieve these mileposts while also 
                                                                                                                    
 154. See supra note 49 and accompanying text. Professor Buell argues that consciousness 
of wrongdoing—often demonstrated by efforts to cover one’s tracks—is often the means by 
which judges decide whether an instance of misconduct qualifies as criminal “fraud.” Samuel 
W. Buell, Novel Criminal Fraud, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1971, 1982–83 (2006). 
 155. Professor Fennell discusses hyperopia and its tendency to produce people who 
excessively save. Fennell, Willpower Taxes, supra note 12, at 1375–76. 
 156. Id. 
 157. “[I]f there is perfect foresight and perfect means for self-commitment, then a person 
with a present-bias is just like someone with no bias.” McAdams, Signaling, supra note 18, at 
658. 
 158.  As noted earlier, the individual with the consistently high discount rate does not lack 
willpower so much as she lacks interest in her future. Fennell, Willpower Taxes, supra note 12, 
at 1416 (explaining that “the question of willpower . . . assumes knowledge of a better long-
term plan than the current self wishes to undertake”). 
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maintaining pathologically high discount rates.159  
Finally, at the inconsistent end of the spectrum are those who lack 
willpower or who hyperbolically discount time.  This is the group that 
scholars such as Professor Utset have done such a nice job of 
highlighting.160 These are the individuals who routinely fall prey to 
their short-term interests, or react too strongly to their emotions and 
make “hot” decisions that conflict with longer-term “cold” 
determinations.161 This, in turn, is the group that is said to “lack 
willpower.”162  
At this point, one might wonder if a relationship exists between 
motivations and temporal consistency. Psychologists have found 
some correlation between altruism and willpower,163 but the finding 
prompts additional questions: Is there something about being faithful 
or faithless that causes a person to either ignore or swear off his time-
inconsistent habits, or is this simply a correlation signifying the 
importance of some other variable?164  
For now, this Article assumes that the two traits are largely 
independent of each other. One’s placement on one spectrum should 
therefore tell us nothing about where one falls on the other spectrum. 
This leaves us with a basic two-by-two matrix: 
 
                                                                                                                    
 159. “Corporations are filled with highly educated individuals who have regularly delayed 
gratification in some domains in order to achieve longer term gains.” Hollander-Blumoff, supra 
note 18, at 548; see also Sally S. Simpson & Nicole Leeper Piquero, Low Self-Control, 
Organizational Theory, and Corporate Crime, 36 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 509, 533 (2002) (finding 
that “key tenets of low self-control theory” were unsupported by survey experiment testing 
attitudes towards corporate crime). Of course, the fact that corporate and white-collar criminals 
exhibit control in some contexts does not mean that they are able to control themselves in 
others. 
 160. E.g., Utset, Hyperbolic Criminals, supra note 18. 
 161. E.g., id. 
 162. As Fennell points out, the hyperopic individual also could lack willpower, insofar as 
she desires—but is otherwise unable—to overcome her tendency to overweigh longer term 
benefits and costs. Fennell, Willpower Taxes, supra note 12, at 1375. 
 163. BAUMEISTER & TIERNEY, supra note 91, at 260. 
 164. See, e.g., Robert H. Frank, The Role of Moral Sentiments in the Theory of 
Intertemporal Choice, in CHOICE OVER TIME, supra note 75, at 265, 266 (arguing that “moral 
sentiments enable people to solve two types of time-inconsistency problems”). 
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Assuming everyone carries equal power and responsibility within 
the organization, we can generate four categories of individuals. We 
might array those categories, from “most valuable” to “most 
harmful,” as follows: 
 
Figure 2a: A Typology of Employees 
 
1. well motivated, consistent 
2. well motivated, inconsistent 
3. opportunistic, inconsistent 
4. opportunistic, consistent 
 
At the top of the heap are those agents who are both well-
motivated and able to adhere to their long-term plans. Some 
individuals come by their self-control naturally. Others may foresee 
their tendency to switch preferences and therefore bind themselves in 
advance to their long-term commitments.165 Whether one’s self-
generated consistency is “natural” or “imposed” is irrelevant for now.   
Next, we consider the well-motivated but inconsistent person.166 
This individual is the poster child for the unfulfilled promise. She 
                                                                                                                    
 165. McAdams, Signaling, supra note 18, at 659. 
 166. McAdams similarly distinguishes between consistent “good” types and inconsistent 
“good” types, albeit for different purposes. Id. at 658 (discussing ways in which “imperfect 
self-commitment” increases the difficulty of distinguishing between cooperative and 
uncooperative partners in prisoner’s dilemma games). 
Figure 2: Matrix
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intends (at least initially) to provide value to her principal but she 
fails to carry out her long-term plans. Instead, she procrastinates and 
either prematurely or excessively consumes, often to her regret.  
All (rational) organizations should prefer category one to category 
two. This is not to say the inconsistent agent is useless. Some work is 
cheap and yields quick benefits up front. A well-motivated hyperbolic 
discounter will experience no problem completing easy projects, some 
of which may be quite valuable to the firm. Moreover, the 
inconsistent agent can become more effecrive if others within the 
organization devise effective precommitment devices to keep her on 
track.  
On the other side of the ledger are those who harbor harmful 
intentions toward their principal. These individuals presumably do 
some good work for their organization, if only to escape immediate 
termination from their jobs. Nevertheless, on net, these are the 
individuals who either harm or impose a risk of harm on their 
respective organizations.  
Admittedly, motivations are not fixed; they may evolve over time 
or change in response to new circumstances.167 An individual’s 
supervisor might threaten to fire an undisclosed number of employees 
in her group; her company might otherwise treat her in a way she 
deems unjustified and undeserved. For any number of reasons, the 
well- motivated employee can become the opportunistic one. 
Moreover, temporal inconsistency may play a role in how motivations 
change.  
One might conclude from the foregoing analysis that corporations 
should shy away from anyone who appears to be temporally 
inconsistent. Unfortunately, that would leave most corporations bereft 
of many of their employees, and unreasonably so, given the fact that 
many corporate employees ultimately comply with the law.168  
Finally, one reaches the worst group in the typology, the consistent 
opportunist.  Readers may disagree as to who poses more danger: the 
consistent or hyperbolic opportunist. The consistent opportunist, who 
knows that she harbors bad intentions, may ironically plan out a series 
of “good acts” to cover her fraud. Moreover, she will respond to the 
threat of sanctions (if they are large and credible enough) because she 
                                                                                                                    
 167. Indeed, if motivations exist separately from temporal inconsistency, then the 
consistent, well-motivated person could also morph into a consistent opportunist. 
 168. “Although newspaper headlines remind us that serious instances of noncompliance 
constantly recur, it nevertheless appears that (at least in most economically advanced 
democracies) most business firms, particularly large ones, substantially comply with most 
kinds of regulations most of the time.” Robert A. Kagan et al., Fear, Duty, and Regulatory 
Compliance: Lessons from Three Research Projects, in EXPLAINING COMPLIANCE 37, 40 
(Christine Parker & Vibeke Lehmann Nielsen eds., 2011). 
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is rational.169 Nevertheless, assuming she is undeterred by existing 
laws, she poses the most danger to her corporation.  She has the 
ability (and inclination) to carry out harmful long-term projects. 
Indeed, to the extent “harm” combines up-front personal costs with 
long-term personal benefits, consistent opportunists are dangerous 
precisely because they possess both the mettle and foresight to bind 
themselves to their opportunistic plans.  
Hyperbolic opportunists, by contrast, pose more of a conundrum. 
They may harbor desires averse to those of their principal, but they 
are not likely to engage in the type of harm that requires a substantial 
amount of up-front work.170 (Then again, they are not likely to 
complete any helpful projects that require up-front work either). 
Accordingly, hyperbolic opportunists are not a threat insofar as harm 
requires up-front work, but they still can do a fair amount of damage 
when they can impose harm easily and with little up-front effort.  
Given the foregoing, an enforcer who has “maxed out” sanctions 
and detection efforts ought to prefer the hyperbolic opportunist to the 
consistent one. Both harbor negative motivations, but only the 
consistent one will expend the energy to engage in harmful long-term 
projects.  Moreover, hyperbolic opportunists are more easily 
identified. Consistent opportunists invest more heavily in expensive 
detection avoidance measures, since avoidance itself requires some 
degree of up-front planning. Hyperbolic opportunists, because they 
lack consistency, are less likely to follow through with sophisticated 
efforts at avoiding detection. 
Thus, the analysis of the two dimensions provides a more nuanced 
portrayal of who is most likely to complete work that is desirable to 
the principal (“good”), and who is most likely to engage in conduct 
that is undesirable to the principal (“bad”): 
 
                                                                                                                    
 169. Government officials appear to recognize this point: “Someone who violates the law 
ruthlessly and rationally is more amenable to deterrence than someone who acts impulsively or 
someone who gives in to enormous pressure.” David M. Becker, What More Can Be Done to 
Deter Violations of the Federal Securities Laws?, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1849, 1851 (2012) (offering 
observations, as former SEC General Counsel, on how the SEC might improve enforcement).  
 170.  See Utset, Hyperbolic Criminals, supra note 18, at 665–67 (labeling the phenomenon 
“time inconsistent obedience”). 
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Figure 3: Tendencies Towards Good and Bad Acts 
  
 Consistent, 
Well-
Motivated 
Inconsistent, 
Well-Motivated 
Inconsistent, 
Opportunistic 
Consistent, 
Opportunistic 
Costly,171 
Good 
Acts  
 
Cheap, 
Good 
Acts 
 
  
Cheap, 
Bad Acts 
  
Costly, 
Bad Acts 
  
 
The depiction in Figure 3 is not an exact representation of 
behavior. Even the consistent, opportunistic employee will perform 
some good activities for his organization. Accordingly, we could 
easily place an “x” in all of the boxes for “cheap, good acts” and we 
might also find that even the consistent opportunist engages in some 
“costly, good acts.”172 The above table depicts the individual’s 
tendency to perform such acts, as compared with everyone else. Thus, 
the individual who is both consistent and opportunistic poses the 
greatest threat of engaging in costly, bad acts. By the same token, the 
consistent, well-motivated employee is best poised to perform 
valuable, but initially costly, good acts.  
Professor Utset has praised temporal inconsistency as desirable 
insofar as it reduces an opportunistic agent’s resolve to engage in 
wrongdoing.173 As Figure 3 demonstrates, the story is a bit more 
nuanced. Opportunistic, temporally inconsistent individuals may be 
less likely to carry out difficult and long-term negative projects, but 
they will have no problem engaging in misconduct that requires little 
effort. 
The broader rule of thumb that one can derive from Figure 3 is that 
temporal inconsistency reduces the variance between faithful and 
opportunistic employees. Good agents are not as good as they intend 
to be, and bad agents are not as bad as they desire to be. Accordingly, 
                                                                                                                    
 171. By “costly,” I mean personally costly to the agent in the first or immediate period, 
and by “cheap,” I mean personally cheap to the agent in the first or immediate period. 
 172. Notice, the conduct is not symmetrical. Whereas all employees will perform some 
“good” acts to keep their jobs, not all employees will perform “bad” acts. 
 173. Utset, Hyperbolic Criminals, supra note 18, at 644–45. 
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when temporal inconsistency is evenly distributed throughout the 
corporate employee and officer population, it reduces the costs of 
erroneously identifying a given agent as faithful or opportunistic.  
Additional complications ensue when one considers the fluidity of 
the two dispositions. Motivations change depending on context and 
personal tastes. The same is true for temporal inconsistency. Some 
people always procrastinate, but others move back and forth along the 
continuum. Finally, it may be the case that one disposition reduces or 
exacerbates the other. Perhaps hyperbolic discounting acts as a 
“gateway” to future opportunistic behavior. (“I already blew the 
deadline, so maybe I should also lie to my boss.”) Or, perhaps an 
opportunistic disposition forces a level of discipline on an individual 
who otherwise would have lacked sufficient willpower. (“Now that I 
have lied to my shareholders, I better take extra care to check my 
regional profit reports every day.”). 
A final caveat: The above typology assumes that all individuals 
hold the same position within the firm. In fact, we know that most 
organizations employ many levels of formal or informal hierarchy.174 
Once we relax the assumption of equal responsibility, the possible 
combinations of temporal inconsistency and opportunism expand 
considerably. Even a two-tier hierarchical scheme is more difficult to 
gauge, as a supervisor may fit any of the four categories, and her 
employee may also fall within any of those four categories.  
III.  THE CORPORATE ENFORCER’S TOOLBOX: POLICING AND 
ARCHITECTURE 
Part II’s depiction of the interaction between opportunism and 
temporal inconsistency provides a useful typology for corporate 
enforcers. Some individuals are opportunistic and consistent (and 
presumably very dangerous) whereas others are well-motivated but 
highly temporally inconsistent, and so on. As one abandons the 
assumption that all employees hold equal responsibility and power, 
one recognizes that opportunism and temporal inconsistency play a 
rich and complex role in generating and masking corporate fraud. 
With this complexity in mind, Part III identifies three strategies 
corporate enforcers might employ to reduce fraud. The three 
strategies, in turn, form the building blocks of two broader 
enforcement approaches. A policing approach attempts to reduce 
fraud by identifying and sanctioning risky people. An architectural 
                                                                                                                    
 174. Rubin, supra note 25, at 352 (observing that “most large firms continue to be 
organized along hierarchical lines”). But see Érica Gorga & Michael Halberstam, Knowledge 
Inputs, Legal Institutions and Firm Structure: Towards a Knowledge-Based Theory of the 
Firm, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1123, 1131–32 (2007) (observing that high-tech firms eschew 
hierarchy).  
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approach focuses on identifying and changing risky structures, in part 
through the encouragement and promulgation of precommitment 
devices.175  
As this Article explains, the two approaches draw upon some of 
the same tools and can behave as substitutes or complements. There 
may be times when policing performs better than architecture (or vice 
versa), but there also may be times when policing benefits from 
architecture (and vice versa). In a world where corporate employees 
and officers are, by varying degrees, opportunistic and temporally 
inconsistent, both approaches are necessary.  
A.  Three Strategies 
Imagine a corporate enforcer who has been tasked with reducing 
wrongdoing within her organization. She encounters individuals who 
fall anywhere on both the “consistency” and “motivational” spectra 
described in Part II. She also confronts a fair amount of wrongdoing 
that has been caused by varying amounts of opportunism and 
temporal inconsistency. How should she respond? 
Broadly speaking, the hypothetical enforcer176 can choose among 
three options. She can screen out potential wrongdoers, either by 
refusing to hire such employees or demanding their termination. She 
also can transform the corporation’s employees, either through some 
combination of external incentives (sanctions and surveillance) or 
internal motivations (culture and norms-based education).177 Finally, 
she can restructure those situations that make opportunism and 
temporal inconsistency more likely and more dangerous to the 
                                                                                                                    
 175. To some degree, the two approaches reflect the opposing regulatory styles described 
by Professor Robert Kagan: 
At one pole, aggressive regulatory offices or officials are called “legalistic”, or 
“sanction”-oriented, devotees of a “deterrence” model or “coercive” style of 
regulation. Toward the other pole, they are labeled “conciliatory” or 
“accommodative”, as more interested in “compliance” than in deterrence, as 
oriented toward seeking results through “cooperation” rather than by coercion, 
as “consultants” rather than “cops.” 
Robert A. Kagan, Understanding Regulatory Enforcement, 11 LAW & POL’Y 89, 92 (1989).  
 176. For the sake of simplicity, this Article imagines a single individual who has the sole 
responsibility for these functions. In reality, of course, multiple individuals may take on the 
roles and strategies described within this section. 
 177. Yuval Feldman describes these two approaches as “extrinsic” and “intrinsic” 
motivations for compliance. The extrinsic motivation arises from fear of sanctions and 
detection, whereas intrinsic motivations arise “out of a sense of moral or civic duty.” Yuval 
Feldman, The Complexity of Disentangling Intrinsic and Extrinsic Compliance Motivations: 
Theoretical and Empirical Insights from the Behavioral Analysis of Law, 35 WASH. U. J.L. & 
POL’Y 11, 12 (2011). 
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corporation. Assuming the enforcer is herself well-motivated and 
consistent (admittedly a large assumption), which strategies should 
she choose?  
1.  Screening 
A screening strategy requires the enforcer to identify and exclude 
(or expel, if the employee already works for the corporation) 
employees who are either consistent or hyperbolic opportunists. She 
might also wish to screen out well-motivated but temporally 
inconsistent indivdiuals, since their motivations too may become 
negative. But at some point, this will leave the corporation with too 
small an employee pool.178 Accordingly, we can assume that she will 
focus primarily on identifying and excluding opportunists. 
In theory, screening is a sound strategy. Opportunists favor 
themselves at everyone else’s expense, and temporally inconsistent 
individuals are either ineffective (since they cannot accomplish 
desirable goals) or enablers of their more opportunistic colleagues. 
Accordingly, all things being equal, the enforcer would prefer either 
to screen out these individuals, or at least fire them before they cause 
serious problems.  
Aside from legal limitations that reduce the corporation’s 
flexibility in hiring or firing, screening’s key drawback is that it is 
prone to error.179 Opportunists are, by definition, deceptive. As for 
temporal inconsistency, screeners may encounter difficulty isolating 
“ordinary” temporal inconsistency from the type of willpower 
deficiencies most likely to enable or produce wrongdoing.180 Many 
people over-eat or fail to complete projects until the last minute, but 
that does not tell us who will produce fraudulent financial statements 
or offer illegal bribes to foreign officials.181  
Where does this leave our enforcer? Certainly she can perform 
criminal history and background checks. And she can watch for 
employees who blatantly transgress rules or repeatedly fail to meet 
internal deadlines or file necessary reports. But beyond these obvious 
                                                                                                                    
 178. See supra p. 36. 
 179. Susan J. Stabile, The Use of Personality Tests as a Hiring Tool: Is the Benefit Worth 
the Cost?, 4 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 279, 290 (2002). 
 180. “Firms may try to screen out employees with impulse control problems, but none of 
the usual methods (psychological tests, interviewing, and checking references) will be 
completely reliable. Firms will therefore have a proportion of employees who will find the 
short-term gains from shirking quite irresistible.” Daniel S. Nagin et al., Monitoring, 
Motivation, and Management: The Determinants of Opportunistic Behavior in a Field 
Experiment, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 850, 854 (2002). 
 181. Researchers have found that individuals can be patient in one context (studying hard 
for exams) and prone to short-term gratification in others. See Preface to CHOICE OVER TIME, 
supra note 75, at xvii–xviii (citing studies showing that discounts can vary for a single person). 
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red flags, she will have little to guide her. “Screening” might, at its 
worst, become an excuse for discriminatory employment practices.182 
One can imagine a number of compliance officers either adopting 
some terrible proxies (assuming that an overweight individual will 
commit fraud, for example) or administering crude psychology 
tests.183 
Apart from error costs, screeners must also contend with 
unintended consequences. For example, if a corporate department 
initially employs ten opportunists and the enforcer’s efforts reduce 
that number to two, then the magnitude and frequency of wrongdoing 
within that department may not in fact decline. For example, if the 
eight opportunists screened out by the enforcer were low-hanging 
fruit, she unintentionally does the remaining two opportunists a favor. 
Freed from competing with eight potential rivals, the remaining two 
may either fill the vacuum left by the eight, or in fact do more harm, 
now that they no longer have to worry about their rivals.184  
Screening thus suffers the same drawbacks as most preventative 
strategies. The enforcer who relies on this strategy may exclude (or 
fire) too many employees or she may exclude (or fire) too few. She 
may identify the wrong individuals as opportunists or she may find 
that firing one opportunist perversely increases the effectiveness of 
the remaining opportunists within the organization. For all these 
reasons and more, our enforcer will need to rely on additional tools.  
2.  Transforming 
In addition to screening, the enforcer might also attempt to 
transform the employee population, moving them from one side of 
either spectra to the other. 
With regard to the first disposition, the enforcer can alter a 
corporate employee’s motivation externally by imposing sanctions for 
noncompliance or by informing employees of the sanctions that 
external enforcers might impose in response to noncompliance.185 For 
these sanctions to be credible, however, the enforcer must also engage 
in some level of monitoring.186 When the threat of sanctions 
                                                                                                                    
 182. Stabile, supra note 179, at 303–08. 
 183. For a critique of corporate personality tests, see generally Stabile, supra note 179.  
 184. Cf. Neal Kumar Katyal, Deterrence’s Difficulty, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2385, 2428 (1997) 
(presenting a similar situation involving drug rings). 
185. See Christine Parker, The Ethics of Advising on Regulatory Compliance: Autonomy 
or Independence, 28 J. BUS. ETHICS 339, 345 (2000) (reporting on conversations with 
compliance officers who have persuaded employees to change behavior by demonstrating 
external costs of noncompliance). 
 186. For a discussion of deterrence theory, see supra Section I.B.  
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increases, the net benefits of opportunistic behavior decreases.187 This 
is the common, “deterrence-based” approach to entity-level corporate 
compliance.188 Applied too aggressively, the deterrence-oriented 
compliance program can backfire by causing mid- and lower-level 
employees to harbor increasing amounts of distrust and resentment 
within the organization.189 Applied too weakly, it can devolve into a 
means for corporations to “purchase” just enough protection from 
entity-level criminal liability while otherwise ignoring (or subtly 
encouraging) widespread illegal behavior.190  
Alternately, the corporate enforcer may attempt to alter 
motivations internally through some type of cultural education191 and 
norms generation.192 Because internalized norms impose an 
immediate conscience-created cost at the moment of bad behavior, 
they may reduce willpower failures. Moreover, they may also increase 
internal whistle-blowing and the likelihood of detection for pure 
opportunists.193 Corporate cultural efforts thus communicate to 
employees both the corporation’s background rules and ethical 
expectations. Cultural compliance efforts tend to remind employees 
that compliance is “everyone’s concern” and that all employees have 
                                                                                                                    
 187. As Professor First has noted: 
A key insight of economics is that actors, whether individuals or 
organizations, will respond to incentives. To the extent that there are 
incentives to cooperate with government investigators in business crime cases, 
those making decisions for the organization will cooperate, even if it means 
that some constituents (employees or, perhaps, current shareholders) suffer. 
First, supra note 64, at 60. 
 188. An important caveat here is that the corporation must receive leniency for catching 
and reporting wrongdoing, otherwise it will have no incentive to implement its compliance 
program. See Arlen & Kraakman, supra note 71, at 690–91; Arlen, supra note 6, at 837. 
 189. Cf. Tyler, supra note 153, at 310 (criticizing the deterrence approach as fostering an 
antagonistic relationship between society and the police); see also IAN AYRES & JOHN 
BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION 20 (Donald R. Harris et al. eds., 1992) (making a 
similar argument in the corporate context and observing that “[a] strategy based mostly on 
punishment fosters an organized business subculture of resistance to regulation”). 
 190. See William S. Laufer, Corporate Liability, Risk Shifting, and the Paradox of 
Compliance, 52 VAND. L. REV. 1343, 1348 n.15 (1999) (cautioning that corporations may view 
corporate compliance as a form of “risk management”). 
 191. See Paternoster & Simpson, supra note 117, at 571 (finding that “reported intentions 
to commit corporate crime were significantly lower for those who thought the act was contrary 
to their personal moral code”). 
 192. See Scott Killingsworth, Modeling the Message: Communicating Compliance 
Through Organizational Values and Culture, 25 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 961, 961 (2012) 
(describing how communication of norms and values can increase compliance and reporting). 
 193. For the value of norms in securing compliance, see Richard H. McAdams, The 
Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338, 386 (1997) and Cass R. 
Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021, 2030 (1996). 
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a responsibility to adhere to the law and ensure that others are doing 
so.194   
Despite their intuitive appeal, strategies that attempt to alter 
internal motivations have their own drawbacks. Norms are difficult to 
develop and measure, and opportunists should be best able to fake the 
presence of good ethics.195 Scholars have long worried that 
corporations can enact “cosmetic” compliance measures that 
insincerely promote ethical behavior while they quietly encourage the 
opposite.196 
Finally, the external and internal approaches can be self-defeating, 
working against each other and undermining compliance overall. 
Strong sanction and monitoring regimes pit the employee in an 
adversarial relationship with the corporation, thereby undermining the 
softer, pro-social arguments for helping the company by following the 
law.197 If the corporation is not careful, its external efforts (threats of 
sanctions or monitoring) may crowd out internal motivations, creating 
a dangerous vacuum in which opportunistic employees who are savvy 
enough to avoid the corporation’s internal policing apparatus remain 
unchecked by fellow employees who have become resentful of the 
organization.198  
3.  Structuring 
The third strategy relies on a form of structuring and builds on an 
approach that Professors Cheng and Lederman have separately 
embraced in other contexts.199 Under this approach, the Enforcer 
                                                                                                                    
194. “[C]ompliance professions continually attempt to ‘cascade’ responsibility for 
compliance down through line management, so that a culture of compliance commitment 
permeates the organization . . . .” Parker, supra note 185, at 346. 
 195. See Richard A. Posner & Eric B. Rasmusen, Creating and Enforcing Norms, with 
Special Reference to Sanctions, 19 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 369, 369 (1999) (arguing there is 
difficulty in government actions designed to “promote desirable norms or repress undesirable 
ones”); Steven Shavell, Law Versus Morality as Regulators of Conduct, 4 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 
227, 254 (2002) (explaining the difficulty of inculcating overarching moral principles through 
the law). 
196. See Kimberly D. Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance and the Failure of Negotiated 
Governance, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 487, 490–91 (2003); Laufer, supra note 190, at 1372 (citing 
surveys indicating that some corporations aim solely for maintaining an appearance of 
compliance rather than “a meaningful culture of ethical awareness and law abidance”). 
 197. See Yuval Feldman & Orly Lobel, The Incentives Matrix: The Comparative 
Effectiveness of Rewards, Liabilities, Duties, and Protections for Reporting Illegality, 88 TEX. 
L. REV. 1151, 1176 (2010) (discussing “crowding out” problems in compliance); see also 
Milton C. Regan, Jr., Moral Intuitions and Organizational Culture, 51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 941, 
971–73 (2007) (distinguishing deterrence-based compliance programs from “values-based” 
programs, which focus on internal norms). 
 198. Feldman & Lobel, supra note 197, at 1155. 
 199. See supra Section I.D. 
44
Florida Law Review, Vol. 66, Iss. 1 [], Art. 2
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol66/iss1/2
2014] CONFRONTING THE TWO FACES OF CORPORATE FRAUD 131 
 
performs a top-down analysis of the company, identifies those 
situations that appear vulnerable to exploitation, and reduces those 
vulnerabilities by changing the methods in which decisions are made 
and implemented.200 Wrongdoing is prevented through institutional 
design rather than through the threat of sanctions and policing.201  
The structural approach requires corporate employees to identify 
operational and compliance risk. At an abstract level, this is not 
difficult to imagine. A decision-making structure in which one 
individual enjoys unbridled discretion and oversight over the 
disposition of large sums of money is one that increases opportunities 
for embezzlement, fraud, and bribery. By the same token, a structure 
that shields from internal oversight the collection and external 
reporting of data increases the probability of financial reporting 
fraud.202 In both of these situations, compelled and continuous 
disclosure vastly reduces opportunities for opportunistic and 
temporally inconsistent behavior.  
Some structures may be as simple as multiple signatory 
requirements (referred to as the “four eyes” principle) or limitations 
on access to information (“Chinese walls”).203 Other structures may 
involve automation or physical limitations that remove individual 
judgment. A speed bump not only forces the driver to slow down, but 
it also removes the traffic officer’s discretion to apprehend drivers 
who exceed certain speeds. The “bump” takes care of the officer’s 
job. By the same token, automation can also either reduce or replace 
the manager’s discretion or impose the equivalent of a second set of 
eyes.  
More concretely, Professor David Zaring has reported on new 
innovations that corporations have devised to reduce foreign bribery, 
including the use of automation to reduce human interaction between 
corporate employees and foreign government officials who might 
                                                                                                                    
 200. See Cheng, supra note 137, at 662–66. 
 201. Id. at 662–63. 
 202. See Lawrence E. Mitchell, Structural Holes, CEOs, and Informational Monopolies: 
The Missing Link in Corporate Governance, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 1313, 1353–54 (2005) 
(discussing Worldcom). For the role that “informational holes” played in the corporate fraud 
scandals of early 2000s, and an argument that legal reform should focus on “how the 
relationship between internal corporate structures and board structures provide opportunities 
for misconduct,” see id. at 1315; see also Nicola Faith Sharpe, Questioning Authority: The 
Critical Link Between Board Power and Process, 38 J. CORP. L. 1, 5–6 (2012), for an argument 
that board-level information failures promote misconduct. 
 203. See, e.g., James H. Freis, Jr., An Outsider’s Look into the Regulation of Insider 
Trading in Germany: A Guide to Securities, Banking, and Market Reform in Finanzplatz 
Deutschland, 19 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 98 n.551 (defining the “four eyes” principle); 
H. Nejat Seyhun, Insider Trading and the Effectiveness of Chinese Walls in Securities Firms, 4 
J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 369, 369 (2008) (defining Chinese walls). 
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otherwise demand illegal payments in person.204 By removing human 
judgment “at the source,” automated technologies eliminate the option 
of bribing local officials in exchange for better or faster services. In 
this sense, structure eliminates the possibility of wrongdoing.  
Admittedly, not all structures function as precommitment devices, 
and certainly, not all structures will be viewed as such.  A hedge fund 
that installs a Chinese wall between two operational units to prevent 
insider trading may be “precommitting” itself by foreclosing 
communication between those two groups. Indeed, some members of 
those units may be thankful for the check on strong but passing 
temptations to break the law. Nevertheless, depending on how the 
corporation devises its internal rules, other employees may perceive 
the Chinese wall as yet another level of bureaucratic regulation.  
Even when self-imposed, not all structures are valuable devices. 
Some structures may rely too heavily on automation; others may 
operate too crudely and foreclose too many options; still others may 
be merely cosmetic and foreclose too few options. Like screening and 
transforming, the structural strategy is far from foolproof. Ulysses got 
it right on the first try, but in the real world, it might take several 
attempts to figure out how best to tie oneself (and others) to the mast. 
B.  Two Approaches 
Section III.A identified three strategies that an enforcer might 
choose to counteract fraud. The strategies, in turn, build up to two 
very different enforcement philosophies and modes of behavior. The 
first is a policing approach that mimics the response we have come to 
expect from government agencies, whereby enforcers utilize 
screening and incentive strategies to identify and punish wrongdoers. 
These are the activities we commonly associate with the term 
“corporate policing.” Professor Jennifer Arlen nicely describes the 
approach as including: “(1) monitoring to detect wrongdoing; (2) 
investigating suspicious activities; (3) reporting violations to federal 
authorities; and (4) cooperating with [government] authorities to help 
them identify and sanction the individuals responsible for the 
violation.”205   
Because it is intended to expand the government’s enforcement 
reach, corporate policing looks and feels very much like its criminal 
law counterpart, government policing. Internal enforcers are expected 
to identify and deter potentially bad people through different 
                                                                                                                    
 204. “Oil service firms and importers have, for example, tried to automate as much of the 
customs process in Indonesia as possible, limiting the number of personal interactions between 
firms and officials.” David Zaring, Private Sector Anti-Bribery Initiatives?, CONGLOMERATE 
(Apr. 5, 2013), http://www.theconglomerate.org/2013/04/private-sector-anti-bribery-initiatives.html.  
205. Arlen, supra note 72, at 332. 
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combinations of surveillance, bounties, threats of sanctions, and 
increasingly pervasive monitoring.206 Having identified the 
corporation’s offenders, internal enforcers are then expected to punish 
said employees by terminating their employment and disclosing their 
names to government authorities.207   
The rhetoric of corporate policing is very much suffused with 
notions of public enforcement and duty. As Professors William 
Bratton and Michael Wachter observe in their discussion of the 
federal government’s internal control requirements for publicly held 
companies: 
Most people, when they look at compliance systems, see 
a new layer of mandated costs . . . . But something else 
also is at work here: a corporate compliance officers is a 
cop, a private sector cop pursuing a public goal.208  
Thus, the policing approach reflects not simply the compliance 
department’s discrete tasks, but rather its overall reason for being. It 
exists to serve the public and it “exercises delegated public authority, 
harnessing corporate resources toward public ends.”209 
The second approach is an architectural approach.210 It relies 
primarily on the structural strategy discussed in the preceding Section, 
although it also draws on norms-based strategies. It seeks not only to 
educate, but also to strengthen already nascent impulses to resist 
temptations to violate the law. It finds some of its theoretical 
grounding in systems theory, which focuses on decision-making 
processes,211 and situational crime theory, which explores the ways in 
                                                                                                                    
206. Professor Harry First has advocated strongly for this “branch office” role. First, supra 
note 64, at 64. For discussion on some of the drawbacks of corporate policing, see Miriam 
Hechler Baer, Corporate Policing and Corporate Governance: What Can We Learn from 
Hewlett-Packard’s Pretexting Scandal?, 77 U. CIN. L. REV. 523, 550–51 (2008) (citing Larry 
Cata Backer, Surveillance and Control: Privatizing and Nationalizing Corporate Monitoring 
After Sarbanes-Oxley, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 327, 370–71). 
207. It is not a coincidence that a number of recent law review articles have referred to the 
Dodd-Frank Act’s whistleblower provisions as good or bad examples of “bounty-hunting.” See, 
e.g., Justin Blount & Spencer Markel, The End of the Internal Compliance World as We Know 
It, or an Enhancement of the Effectiveness of Securities Law Enforcement? Bounty Hunting 
Under the Dodd-Frank Act’s Whistleblower Provisions, 17 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 1023 
(2012). 
208. William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, Tracking Berle’s Footsteps: The Trail of 
The Modern Corporation’s Last Chapter, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 849, 872 (2010). 
209. Id. 
 210. Cheng, supra note 137, at 662–63. 
211. “Systems theory depicts organizations as converting external inputs (e.g., resources, 
investment new recruits) into outputs (e.g., products and services) via a ‘throughput’ stage, 
which comprises the organization’s entire operations and activities. See Nicole Gillespie & 
Graham Dietz, Trust Repair After an Organization-Level Failure, 34 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 127, 
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which geography and other contextual variables affect the incidence 
of crime.212 Under this approach, the corporation’s systems are akin to 
a dark alley or poorly traversed street. The corporate architect 
identifies the corporation’s dark alleys and then attempts either to 
eliminate or illuminate them.213 
Undoubtedly, policing and architecture use some of the same 
tools. Disclosure and reporting rules, for example, can simultaneously 
provide a policing regime with necessary proof while also serving as a 
structural device that deflects temptation at just the right moment. 
“Monitoring” can serve either as a gentle check on our short-term 
selves or as a heavy-handed form of oversight designed to deter all 
but the most hardened opportunists. 
Despite this overlap, several characteristics distinguish the two 
approaches. The policeman’s goal (deter and punish) is distinctly 
different from the architect’s (reduce temptation). Policemen and 
architects communicate with their subjects differently and inspire 
different reactions in corporate employees. And, as noted earlier, 
policing serves a quasi-public end, whereas architecture seeks 
generally to improve the inner workings of the firm.  
Not surprisingly, the two approaches also imply different roles for 
corporate compliance personnel. Since the policing approach places a 
premium on investigations and sanctions, it favors an “external” 
compliance department, staffed by lawyers214 and situated outside of 
the corporation’s operational units.215 By contrast, the architect works 
                                                                                                                    
130 (2009). 
212. “At the beginning of the twenty-first century, one of the most important and 
underexplored forms of crime control is architecture.” Neal Kumar Katyal, Architecture as 
Crime Control, 111 YALE L.J. 1039, 1041 (2002); see also Darryl K. Brown, Cost-Benefit 
Analysis in Criminal Law, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 323, 349–50 (2004) (explaining the general theory 
and providing examples); Ronald V. Clarke, Situational Crime Prevention, 19 CRIME & JUST. 
91, 93 (1995). 
213. In a related vein, following the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 
Professor Donald Langevoort praised the Act’s emphasis on internal controls, in part because 
internal controls were likely to improve “corporate sightlines” and thereby reduce the 
opportunity to engage in misconduct. Langevoort, supra note 53, at 969. 
214. Whether lawyers improve or undermine the corporation’s compliance function is a 
separate debate. Compare DeStefano, supra note 19 (arguing in favor of attorney involvement), 
with Tanina Rostain, The Emergence of “Law Consultants,” 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1397, 1400 
(2006) (observing concern that the use of lawyers in nonlegal compliance positions may cause 
them to become overly technocratic and less wed to “public values”). 
 215. For an argument that corporate compliance has been unnecessarily “decoupled” from 
the rest of the organization and that integration of the compliance function with the rest of the 
organization is necessary to improve corporate culture, see Blount & Markel, supra note 207, at 
1060–61; compare Larry E. Ribstein, Delawyering the Corporation, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 305, 
307 (2012), for an argument that the corporation’s in-house legal department may one day 
dissolve. For an argument that oversight should come from someone who was not a party to an 
original operational decision, see Medwed, supra note 21, at 88. 
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side by side with the employees and officers who make operational 
decisions.216 
The architectural approach incorporates some of the teachings of 
the corporate values movement that first emerged in the 1990s,217 and 
it bears a strong resemblance to the New Governance regulatory 
agenda that has become increasingly popular within the past two 
decades.218 The architect may persuade, and indeed at times regulate, 
but she generally does not punish. The approach additionally reflects 
more recent arguments regarding the proper direction in which in-
house counsel’s role ought to evolve. For example, shortly before his 
death, Professor Larry Ribstein forecasted that the in-house legal 
function would eventually devolve back into the corporation-at-
large;219 he referred to this process as “delawyering.”220 With respect 
to corporate compliance, Ribstein imagined a world in which 
“[l]awyers would function . . . as architects and engineers rather than 
as mechanics applying rules.”221  
C.  Substitutes and Complements 
The previous section introduced two enforcement approaches, 
policing and architecture. The two approaches can function either as 
substitutes or complements. 
Consider, first, the tradeoffs the two approaches pose. The 
                                                                                                                    
 216. Cf. Ribstein, supra note 215, at 315–16 (describing how software can be designed to 
assist decision makers). 
 217. See Kathleen M. Boozang & Simone Handler-Hutchinson, “Monitoring” Corporate 
Corruption: DOJ’s Use of Deferred Prosecution Agreements in Health Care, 35 AM. J. L. & 
MED. 89, 105–06 (2009) (distinguishing between discipline and values orientations in 
compliance programs); David Hess, Robert S. McWhorter & Timothy L. Fort, The 2004 
Amendments to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines and Their Implicit Call for a Symbiotic 
Integration of Business Ethics, 11 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 725, 733−34 (2006) 
(distinguishing a “compliance-based” approach from an “integrity-based” approach); Regan, 
supra note 197, at 970–73 (describing differences between a “values based” and deterrence-
based compliance program). 
 218. Professor Cunningham notes this “philosophical shift away from traditional 
deterrence-oriented strategies toward more cooperative and rewards-oriented systems to 
promote compliance.” Lawrence A. Cunningham, Beyond Liability: Rewarding Effective 
Gatekeepers, 92 MINN. L. REV. 323, 324 (2007). For more on New Governance generally, see 
Jason M. Solomon, Law and Governance in the 21st Century Regulatory State, 86 TEX. L. REV. 
819, 821–37 (2008) (book review) (describing New Governance literature and suggesting 
future directions for New Governance scholarship) and Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall 
of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 
342 (2004) (discussing the emergence, rationales, and motivations of New Governance theory, 
the organizing principles of the New Governance model, and its practical application in 
employment, environmental, and digital technology law). 
 219. Ribstein, supra note 215, at 307. 
 220. The title of Ribstein’s article was Delawyering the Corporation. See id. at 305. 
 221. Id. at 316.  
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policing approach may not be particularly uplifting, but it is an 
essential component of any compliance program. Temporally 
consistent, opportunistic individuals pose a constant threat to widely 
dispersed shareholders within publicly held corporations. 
Shareholders demand objective and periodic proof of corporate 
performance, to both eliminate shirking and ensure that they have 
invested their capital appropriately. Not all employees and officers 
will meet their performance goals, however, leading some to decide to 
cheat and commit some variant of fraud.222 Over the long run, 
temporally consistent opportunists will perpetrate the worst schemes 
and the best cover-ups. Since hiring screens inevitably fail, the 
corporation has no choice but to utilize policing tools to investigate 
and identify wrongdoers.223 
Policing, however, imposes a number of costs. First, the 
corporation’s policemen are likely to develop interests in maintaining 
and increasing their positions of power within the organization, quite 
apart from actual threats to corporate integrity.224 Turf-building 
presents opportunity costs.  
Second, policing, as noted earlier, may unintentionally erode 
compliance norms. For example, heavy-handed methods may trigger 
feelings of distrust among employees, thereby reducing internal 
motivations to comply with the law. This is particularly likely if 
employees believe the corporation has violated their privacy or has 
imposed an excessive sanction in relation to a given type of 
misconduct. Finally, policing may create a false sense of security in 
putative victims, causing them to assume incorrectly that they can 
relax their vigilance because sanctions and oversight mechanisms 
have been enacted.225  
Like its counterpart, corporate architecture is also an essential 
component of an effective compliance program. It is both proactive 
                                                                                                                    
222. On the connection between performance failure and fraud, see generally Arlen & 
Carney, supra note 57 (attributing fraud to “final period” problems); Velikonja, supra note 60, 
at 1908–09. But see Cindy R. Alexander & Mark A. Cohen, New Evidence on the Origins of 
Corporate Crime, 17 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 421, 432–33 (1996) (finding weaker and 
not statistically significant correlations between prior performance and corporate fraud in data 
on public companies from 1975–1989). 
223. Nagin et al., supra note 180, at 854 (concluding that because screens fail, corporate 
firms will “therefore have a proportion of employees who will find the short-term gains from 
shirking quite irresistible” and that responding to such impulses “requires the imposition of 
costs that are as immediate and near at hand as the gains from shirking”). 
224. Within larger corporations, budgets for corporate compliance now number in the 
millions. See, e.g., PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, BROADER PRESPECTIVES; HIGHER 
PERFORMANCE: STATE OF COMPLIANCE: 2012 STUDY 9, 16–17 [hereinafter PWC STUDY], 
http://www.pwc.com/en_US/us/risk-management/assets/2012-compliance-study.pdf.  
225. See generally Amitai Aviram, Counter-Cyclical Enforcement of Corporate Law, 24 
YALE J. REG. 1 (2008). 
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and potentially innovative. It can reduce both the temptation and 
opportunity to commit wrongdoing, while also providing adequate 
space for employees and officers to pursue risky but net positive 
projects.  
To be sure, architecture poses its own set of drawbacks. 
Oversight, particularly the type of pervasive oversight imagined here, 
can be time-consuming and expensive. Speed bumps in corporate 
decision-making can translate into sluggishness in operations.226 
Chinese walls, which reduce wrongdoing by fencing off information, 
can also cause information holes and inefficiency. At its worst, the 
architectural approach may fuel a kind of bureaucratic second-
guessing that squelches risk-taking and innovation and that 
inadvertently rewards shirking and risk aversion.  
These worries were exactly the types of concerns raised when 
Congress enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, which all but 
demanded additional architecture—and policing—for corporate firms 
by holding management accountable for inadequate “internal 
controls.”227 The Act eliminated plausible deniability for CEO and 
CFO’s insofar as they were now forced to certify financial statements 
and attest to the reliability of the firm’s internal financial reporting 
mechanisms.228 In addition, the Act required the company’s outside 
auditor to attest to management’s commitment to maintaining the 
company’s internal controls.229 Thus, one could point to the Act’s 
internal control requirements and conclude that the legislation 
provided the necessary impetus for improving corporate 
                                                                                                                    
226. Chris Durden & Richard Pech, The Increasing Cost of Corporate Governance: 
Decision Speed Bumps for Managers, 6 CORP. GOVERNANCE 84, 92 (2006). 
227. Professors Bratton and Wachter perceive the internal controls provisions of the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act as a kind of policing, “forcing 
corporations to participate directly in the enforcement enterprise.” Bratton & Wachter, supra 
note 208, at 872. By contrast, Professor Utset perceives provisions such as the certification 
requirement in § 302 as a valuable deflection device that “make[s] more salient—at the point in 
time when a manager makes a securities filing—the costs she would incur if she were to fail to 
comply with federal securities laws.” Utset, Hyperbolic Criminals, supra note 18, at 658. 
228. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 302, 116 Stat. 745, 777–78 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. and 18 U.S.C.). On eliminating 
plausible deniability by forcing certification, see Hillary A. Sale, Public Governance, 81 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 1012, 1025 (2013). 
229. Id. § 404. Section 302 requires the CFO and CEO to certify in each quarterly filing 
that they have reviewed the filing and that it “fairly represents” the company’s financial 
condition and does not contain, to the best of their knowledge, any misstatement. Id. § 302. In 
addition, § 302 requires the CFO and CEO to attest that they are responsible for ensuring 
adequate internal controls, that they have evaluated the effectiveness of said controls, and that 
they have discussed any changes in those controls. Id. Section 404 requires management to 
include in the corporation’s annual report an assessment “of the effectiveness of the internal 
control structure and procedures of the issuer for financial reporting,” which then must be 
attested to by the corporation’s outside auditor. Id. § 404. 
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architecture.230 
Critics, however, vehemently disagreed with this happy story. 
Instead, they claimed the “architecture” that emerged from Sarbanes-
Oxley was too costly (at least for smaller firms), overly standardized, 
and largely politically motivated.231 Moreover, as Professor John 
Coffee explains, the attestation requirement in § 404 eventually led to 
the situation whereby auditors conducted a “dual audit” of the 
corporation: “first, a traditional audit of the issuer's financial 
statements and, second, an audit of the issuer’s internal controls.”232 
In sum, to the extent Sarbanes-Oxley represented a move toward 
enhanced corporate architecture, it was (to its critics) the worst kind 
of architecture: expensive, government-mandated, and one that 
ultimately transferred the shareholders’ wealth to outside auditors.233  
Responding to the above critiques, Sarbanes-Oxley’s proponents 
have questioned whether corporations could or would have credibly 
improved their internal reporting devices on their own.234 They also 
contend that the business community exaggerated the Act’s 
compliance costs and conveniently ignored “its countervailing 
benefits.”235 
Although largely beyond the scope of this Article, the debate 
illuminates architecture’s key challenges. Because it is more 
qualitative than quantitative, it is difficult for outsiders to verify 
architecture’s existence.236 For that reason, and particularly in the 
                                                                                                                    
230. One might also have concluded, as Professor Cunningham did, that a number of 
Sarbanes-Oxley’s provisions merely amplified pre-existing requirements. Lawrence A. 
Cunningham, The Sarbanes-Oxley Yawn: Heavy Rhetoric, Light Reform (And It Might Just 
Work), 35 CONN. L. REV. 915, 918 (2003). 
231. The classic critiques include William J. Carney, The Costs of Being Public After 
Sarbanes-Oxley: The Irony of “Going Private,” 55 EMORY L.J. 141 (2006) (arguing that 
excessive compliance costs associated with § 404 will cause public firms to go private or 
delist); Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate 
Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521 (2005)  (questioning empirical support for several key 
provisions in Act); and also Larry Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory Reponses to Corporate 
Fraud: A Critique of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28 J. CORP. L. 1, 39 (2002) (similar 
arguments). 
232. John C. Coffee, Jr., The Political Economy of Dodd-Frank: Why Financial Reform 
Tends to Be Frustrated and Systemic Risk Perpetuated, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1019, 1038 
(2012). Coffee observes that the dual audit feature was not mandated by Sarbanes-Oxley itself, 
but came about because of a ruling by the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board. Id.  
233. Id. (citing argument that dual audits enriched auditing profession). 
234. See generally Robert A. Prentice & David B. Spence, Sarbanes-Oxley as Quack 
Corporate Governance: How Wise is the Received Wisdom?, 95 GEO. L.J. 1843 (2007). 
235. Robert Prentice, Sarbanes-Oxley: The Evidence Regarding the Impact of SOX 404, 
29 CARDOZO L. REV. 703, 703 (2007). 
236. Assessing and demonstrating compliance effectiveness has become an important 
issue for compliance officers. See PWC STUDY, supra note 224, at 12–13. For more on the 
observability of compliance efforts and how it may shape internal compliance decisions, see 
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wake of public scandals, legislators and regulators are not likely to 
permit regulated entities to devise their own antifraud architecture. 
Instead, public actors will be inclined to mandate blunt and politically 
popular “fixes.”  
Although the foregoing discussion has discussed architecture and 
policing’s relative strengths and weaknesses, the two are not solely 
substitutes. In numerous instances, they are complements.  
For example, structures that stress disclosure or require multiple 
signatories on filed documents deflect momentary lapses of judgment 
(architecture), but also make it easier to identify rogues and rank 
opportunists after the fact (policing). Good processes make policing 
more effective, which in turn reduces opportunities and incentives to 
cheat.  
At the same time, policing can make architecture more effective. 
Recall that “structure” can include anything from a narrowly crafted 
deflection device (a certification requirement or checklist) to a drastic 
reduction in options (a decision not to do any business in China in 
order to eliminate the possibility of bribing government officials). The 
more drastic structures reduce opportunities for innovation and 
legitimate business activity but otherwise ensure legal compliance. 
One cannot easily violate the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act if one’s 
company declines to do work overseas. But that also means foregoing 
lucrative opportunities across the globe.  
Much of the legal scholarship on “structure” has focused on the 
differences between ex ante and ex post responses to wrongdoing.237 
A different, yet equally important question is how enforcers structure 
requirements optimally. If an enforcer chooses a “structural” device, 
how sharply should that structural device cut? As much as we want 
Ulysses to foreclose the option of steering the ship in the wrong 
direction, we still want him to sail home. Which factors enable the 
corporate architect to fine-tune and customize devices such that they 
reduce some options, but do not wholly foreclose others?  
Here, credible policing may play some salutary role. As Professor 
Jon Elster observed, a number of precommitment devices depend on 
third parties in order to function effectively: 
Ulysses did not bind himself to the mast; he had himself 
tied by the rowers and made sure that they could not hear 
any counterorders he might issue. People who want to 
force themselves to save can join a Christmas Club, 
                                                                                                                    
Alexander S. P. Pfaff & Chris William Sanchirico, Environmental Self-Auditing: Setting the 
Proper Incentives for Discovery and Correction of Environmental Harm, 16 J. L. ECON. & 
ORG. 189, 198 (2000) (discussing observability problem). 
 237. See, e.g., Cheng, supra note 137, at 657. 
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which will be deaf to any demands for withdrawal of the 
funds before December 15. . . . What is common to these 
and many other cases is that the individual can enlist 
others in the effort to bind himself.238 
Elster’s insight is important: for precommitment devices to 
function effectively, we need reliable third parties who can help us 
bind ourselves to our original commitments. If those upon whom we 
depend are opportunistic and have an interest in seeing us fail, mast-
tying and Christmas clubs quickly lose their value. Accordingly, if 
corporate enforcers can be “bribed” into acquiescence, as critics claim 
was the case with auditors in the late 1990s and credit rating agencies 
in the lead-up to the 2008 financial crisis,239 then some level of 
policing is necessary to ensure that the enforcers and their overseers 
maintain a genuine interest in complying with the law.  
How do we solve this recursive problem whereby corporate 
enforcers themselves are so opportunistic or feckless that they fail to 
implement or maintain existing architectural devices?  Here, policing, 
particularly the type of policing aimed strategically at the worst and 
most obvious offenders, may assist in the development and 
refinement of corporate architecture.240 By screening out and 
deterring the most dangerous and opportunistic wrongdoers, policing 
can provide the rest of the community the space to devise structures 
that are permissive and yet disabling in the right proportions.  
IV.  CORPORATE COMPLIANCE AND THE PREFERENCE FOR 
POLICING 
As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, corporations must 
confront two dispositions at the same time: the tendency to be 
temporally inconsistent and the motivation to harm or take advantage 
of others. Examining the interaction between these dispositions, in 
turn, reveals a four-part typology that suggests differing levels of 
danger among corporate employees and officers. Fraud, in turn, arises 
out of a combination of planned and spur-of-the-moment misconduct. 
The corporation’s internal enforcer therefore must arm himself with 
                                                                                                                    
 238. Jon Elster, Don’t Burn Your Bridge Before You Come to It: Some Ambiguities and 
Complexities of Precommitment, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1751, 1759 (2003). 
 239. See, e.g., Jodi L. Short, Competing Normative Frameworks and the Limits of 
Deterrence Theory: Comments on Baker and Griffith’s Ensuring Corporate Misconduct, 38 
LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 493, 497−98 (2013) (comparing auditor failures with credit rating agency 
failures).  
 240. For the differences between “randomized,” “comprehensive,” and “strategic” 
policing models, along with an endorsement of the benefits of a strategic policing model that 
targets the worst offenders, see Margaret H. Lemos & Alex Stein, Strategic Enforcement, 95 
MINN. L. REV. 9, 9−12 (2010). 
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some combination of policing and architecture.  
Ideally, internal corporate enforcers would choose the most cost-
effective mix of approaches, depending on the context and attendant 
risks. In this perfect world, internal enforcers would choose those 
combinations of screening, transformation, and structural strategies 
that best reflect their employee population and their company’s 
particular risk profile. Professor Omari Scott Simmons analogizes this 
contextual, global approach to an immune system that relies on a 
varied set of adaptive responses in order to minimize external stress 
and restore “internal equilibrium.”241 Although broader in scope, 
Simmons’s analogy envelops the pluralistic enforcement approach 
suggested here.  
But what if certain factors skew the internal corporate enforcer’s 
analysis in one direction? Which approach would we expect to 
dominate, and how would this outcome affect the corporation’s 
internal response to corporate fraud? 
This final Part explores these questions, first by discussing the rise 
of the modern corporate compliance program, and then by 
constructing a theoretical account of why stakeholders inside and 
outside the corporation may push its compliance effort excessively 
towards policing and away from architectural progress.  
A.  The Emergence of Corporate Compliance and Risk Management 
Not long after the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,242 
Professor Manuel Utset theorized that temporal inconsistency might 
have played a role in the corporate fraud accounting scandals that had 
preceded the Act.243 He theorized that gatekeeping—including the 
creation of oversight and surveillance systems within the firm—
required extensive up-front costs.244 If corporate gatekeepers were 
temporally inconsistent, Utset reasoned, then they would rationally 
procrastinate beefing up oversight programs, to the long-term 
detriment of the company.245 Given this fear, Sarbanes-Oxley’s 
emphasis on internal compliance and enhanced internal corporate 
controls made sense, as it effectively forced corporate gatekeepers to 
                                                                                                                    
 241. Omari Scott Simmons, The Corporate Immune System: Governance from the Inside 
Out, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1131, 1151–53. 
 242. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 
U.S.C. and 18 U.S.C.). 
 243. See Utset, supra note 8, at 434. 
 244.  See id. at 435. 
 245. Id. at 434–35 (casting the problem as arising primarily at the corporate board level). 
“[G]atekeepers may have had a long-term preference to actively monitor and discipline 
managers, but they repeatedly procrastinated following through.” Id. at 434. 
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“commit” to corporate compliance.246  
Of course, many of the external incentives to develop a corporate 
compliance program were already in place by the time Sarbanes-
Oxley was enacted.247 The compliance profession first emerged in the 
1960’s and grew throughout the end of the century.248 Deferred 
prosecution agreements, the primary settlement tool for criminal 
prosecutions of corporations, first surfaced in the 1990s.249 The U.S. 
Sentencing Commission’s Organizational Guidelines were first 
promulgated in 1991 and then revised in 2004 pursuant to the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act in order to further define the meaning of an 
“effective compliance and ethics program.”250 The Organizational 
Guidelines significantly reduce criminal sanctions for those 
organizations that adopt an “effective” internal compliance 
program.251 During the same time period, the SEC implemented its 
own deferred prosecution regime, memorialized in what is commonly 
known as the Seaboard Report, which offered the promise of leniency 
for corporations that implemented compliance programs and self-
reported evidence of wrongdoing.252 
Meanwhile, the related but distinct “enterprise risk management” 
(ERM) industry also emerged and expanded during this time 
period.253 Enterprise risk management enables firms to identify and 
                                                                                                                    
 246. Id. at 442 (theorizing that Sarbanes-Oxley’s internal controls and certification 
requirements acted as precommitment devices to counteract gatekeeper tendencies toward 
procrastination). 
 247. See Rostain, supra note 214, at 1402 (tracing the rise of the “compliance consulting 
industry” to the enactment of the Federal Organizational Sentencing Guidelines in 1991).  
 248. “Compliance officers in the U.S. securities industry began to meet as early as the 
1960s with their 1996 conference having over 2200 participants.” Parker, supra note 185, at 
344. 
 249. John Gibeaut, A Matter of Opinion: Speakers Debate Whether Deferred Prosecution 
Agreements Help Corporations, A.B.A. J., Oct. 2006, at 58, 58. 
 250. The Guidelines offer the possibility  of a reduced sentence for convicted corporations 
that nevertheless maintained “effective” compliance programs. U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION 
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1(a) & cmt. background (2012). 
 251. See Paul Fiorelli & Ann Marie Tracey, Why Comply? Organizational Guidelines 
Offer a Safer Harbor in the Storm, 32 J. CORP. L. 467, 467–68 (2007) (stating there is a 
potential “80:1 swing in what a company may have to pay in federal fines, depending on 
whether it had good ethics and compliance programs, or bad ethics and compliance programs”).  
 252. See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, REPORT OF INVESTIGATION PURSUANT TO SECTION 
21(A) OF THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 AND COMMISSION STATEMENT ON THE 
RELATIONSHIP OF COOPERATION TO AGENCY ENFORCEMENT DECISIONS, Exchange Act Release 
No. 44,969 (Oct. 23, 2001) [hereinafter SEABOARD REPORT], available at 
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/investreport/34-44969.htm; see also Matt A. Vega, Beyond 
Incentives: Making Corporate Whistleblowing Moral in the New Era of Dodd-Frank Act 
“Bounty-Hunting,” 45 CONN. L. REV. 483, 517–18 & n.194 (2012) (summarizing and 
explaining the relevance of the Seaboard Report and why it has acquired that name). 
 253. See Betty Simkins & Steven A. Ramirez, Enterprise-Wide Risk Management and 
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reduce a variety of enterprise-wide risks, including the risk that 
employees may break the law.254 The ERM framework, which was 
developed by the Treadway Commission’s Committee of Sponsoring 
Organizations (COSO),255 was released in 2004,256 two years after 
Sarbanes-Oxley’s enactment. The framework expands upon a number 
of principles that COSO previously articulated in its “Internal 
Framework,” which would eventually become the Sarbanes-Oxley 
benchmark for testing internal financial reporting controls within 
public corporations.257 “Internal controls” in turn, had been a topic of 
interest to lawmakers and regulators since at least the 1970s.258  
In sum, plenty of compliance-related “commitment devices” were 
in place prior to the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, and the 
emphasis on compliance only expanded in Sarbanes-Oxley’s wake. 
More than a decade following the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley, both 
“compliance” and “risk management” have become key functions 
within public corporations.259 That does not mean, however, that 
fraud is no longer a realistic concern, particularly if compliance 
programs lack the optimal mix of policing and architecture. 
At first glance, compliance and risk management programs are 
                                                                                                                    
Corporate Governance, 39 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 571, 580–81, 583–84 (2008). 
 254. See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Caremark and Enterprise Risk Management, 34 J. CORP. 
L. 967, 969 (2009) (“Enterprise risk management is the process by which a business 
organization anticipates, prevents, and responds to uncertainties associated with the 
organization’s strategic objectives. . . . [It] is the process by which business organizations 
proactively determine the types and levels of risk appropriate for achieving the organization’s 
strategic goals.” (footnote omitted)); Deborah A. DeMott, The Stages of Scandal and the Roles 
of General Counsel, 2012 WIS. L. REV. 463, 468–69 (“Enterprise risk management incorporates 
corporate governance as a mechanism of managing behavioral risks with financial and 
technical risk management”); see also Michelle M. Harner, Ignoring the Writing on the Wall: 
The Role of Enterprise Risk Management in the Economic Crisis, 5 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 45, 47 
(2010) (arguing that financial institutions’ inattention to ERM contributed to the financial 
crisis). 
 255. COSO comprises the major accounting trade organizations. About Us, COMMITTEE 
SPONSORING ORGS. TREADWAY COMMISSION, http://www.coso.org/aboutus.htm (last visited 
Feb. 10, 2014). 
 256. Id. (“Regarding ERM, in 2004 COSO issued Enterprise Risk Management – 
Integrated Framework.”). 
 257. See Langevoort, supra note 53, at 953–55 (describing emergence of COSO’s internal 
controls framework and status as the de facto benchmark for demonstrating adequate internal 
controls for Sarbanes-Oxley). 
 258. Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Appeal and Limits of Internal Controls to Fight 
Fraud, Terrorism, Other Ills, 29 J. CORP. L. 267, 273 (2004) (tracing the emergence of internal 
controls regulation back thirty years). For the differences between financial and compliance 
controls, see id. at 277. 
 259. A 2012 report by PricewaterhouseCoopers and Compliance Week indicated that 
compliance officers’ jurisdiction within their corporations and budgets were increasing. PWC 
STUDY, supra note 224, at 16. 
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exactly the types of platforms that should accommodate the policing 
and architectural approaches. One could imagine compliance 
personnel and risk managers working side by side, the former 
focusing on policing and the latter implementing and perfecting 
precommitment devices. Alternately, one could imagine a platform 
that integrated both goals and approaches at the same time, with 
compliance and risk managers drawing upon both approaches 
simultaneously.260 Moreover, legislation such as Sarbanes-Oxley 
would appear to encourage architecture as much as it encourages 
corporate policing. It requires firms to strengthen internal monitoring 
systems, but as Professor Utset has approvingly pointed out, it also 
demands the implementation of temptation-reducing devices such as 
prohibitions on loans to officers and requirements that the 
corporation’s CEO and CFO attest to the reliability and health of the 
company’s internal controls.261 Ideally, the emergence of these two 
related and overlapping industries ought to have made corporations—
and the economies and industries in which they operate—safer 
investments and less prone to scandal and misreporting.  
So much for the idealized vision. Even with fewer financial 
reporting scandals, few would argue that the compliance and risk-
management industries have lived up to their promise. The 2008 
Financial Crisis undercuts any notion of effective risk management, at 
least with regard to financial firms.262 JPMorgan’s recent “London 
Whale” debacle—in which one of its traders acquired a massive 
position in risky derivative bets and ultimately caused the bank to lose 
in excess of six billion dollars—stands as a more recent example of 
inadequate risk management.263  
In a similar vein, proponents of the Dodd-Frank Act have argued 
that the directors and managers of financial institutions caused so 
much harm to the economy precisely because they lacked either the 
ability or the incentive to properly manage risk.264 At the same time, 
                                                                                                                    
 260. For the overlapping roles of risk management and compliance assurance for 
corporate directors and an argument that risk management and compliance are similar “in kind” 
but differ “in degree,” see Bainbridge, supra note 254, at 978–84. 
261. See discussion supra at pp. 50–51. 
262. See Harner, supra note 254, at 47; Renee M. Jones & Michelle Welsh, Toward a 
Public Enforcement Model for Directors’ Duty of Oversight, 45 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 343, 
345–46 (2012). 
 263.  See, e.g., Kathryn Judge, Interbank Discipline, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1262, 1288 (2013) 
(explaining the scandal and observing that banks “all too often fail to accurately assess their 
own risk exposures”). For arguments that risk management failures were limited largely to 
financial institutions, see Brian R. Cheffins, Did Corporate Governance “Fail” During the 
2008 Stock Market Meltdown? The Case of the S&P 500, 65 BUS. LAW. 1, 3 (2009). 
 264.  See Jones & Welsh, supra note 262, at 346 (“Directors remained blind to significant 
departures from approved risk management guidelines and failed to detect flaws in financial 
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corporate compliance officers within those institutions have also 
come under fire.265 Much hand-wringing occurred, for example, when 
it became clear that JPMorgan not only allowed excessively risky 
trading, but also failed to disclose the full size of its losses promptly 
and transparently. The bank’s problems inhered not solely in its 
management of risk, but also in its reporting of material losses, a core 
compliance function.266 
Even putting aside financial firms, which may be sui generis, the 
evidence is mixed on how well the modern compliance program 
works.267 Although there now exists a plethora of corporate 
compliance tools, as well as organizations that provide specialized 
consulting services to corporations seeking the reduction of 
wrongdoing,268 fraud and deceptive practices continue to arise, 
particularly in the wake of market downturns and recessions.269 True, 
a particular method of fraud may decline in the wake of a series of 
investigations and prosecutions.270 But misrepresentation and similar 
                                                                                                                    
reporting practices that led to systematic underreporting of leverage and the concealment of 
devastating losses.”). 
265. This criticism is not new. Lori Richards, then the SEC’s Director of the Office of 
Compliance Inspections and Examinations, addressed a meeting of compliance professionals in 
2005, stating in part: 
[O]ver the last several years, . . . [t]errible scandals had come to light, with 
large scale dishonesty, serious breaches of fiduciary duty, violations by well-
known leaders of the securities industry, and misconduct of some audacity. I 
often had the unfortunate duty of asking you - “where was compliance?” 
Specifically I asked: “Where was compliance when these problems arose, took 
shape, and became entrenched in the offending firms?” 
Lori Richards, Dir., Office of Compliance Inspections & Examinations, U.S. Sec. & Exch. 
Comm’n, Remarks before the Nat’l Soc’y of Compliance Prof’ls Nat’l Membership Meeting 
(Oct. 25, 2005) (transcript available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch102605lr.htm). 
 266. JPMorgan’s compliance weaknesses were particularly surprising in light of the fact 
that the bank’s chief compliance officer was Stephen Cutler, a former chief of the SEC’s 
Enforcement Division. See James B. Stewart, When Trying to Follow Rules Isn’t Enough, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 20, 2013), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/21/business/at-
jpmorgan-trying-to-do-the-right-thing-isnt-enough.html (discussing JPMorgan’s compliance 
failures). 
 267. For a discussion on the inherent limitations of internal controls, see Cunningham, 
supra note 258. For a more specific argument on how corporate compliance regulation has 
gone awry, and for a warning that emphasis on “corporate compliance” may ultimately produce 
“greater individual ‘white collar’ deviance,” see Laufer, supra note 190, at 1350. 
 268. For the growth of the compliance industry, see Baer, supra note 20, at 993–99; see 
also Cunningham, supra note 258, at 269 (observing that the emphasis on “internal controls” 
has helped the auditing and legal professions). 
 269. Rapp, supra note 57, at 104. 
 270. For example, Kathleen Boozang and Simone Handler-Hutchinson observe with 
regard to the health care context:  
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types of wrongdoing appear to be quite sticky.271 If financial reporting 
fraud is not the problem it was in 1999, we still have to worry about 
international bribery and other alternative types of wrongdoing that 
have yet to surface. Indeed, this is one of the reasons why the federal 
criminal fraud statutes are so notoriously open-ended.272  
The evidence on specific corporate settlements between 
corporations and prosecutors or the SEC is not much better. In 
separate studies, Professors Jayne Barnard and Brandon Garrett both 
praise monitors and structural settlements that address the specific 
situational factors that encourage misconduct.273 At the same time, 
both find shortcomings in these programs. Barnard, who interviewed 
corporate defense attorneys, reports that “everybody hates” the 
compliance consultants because they are “expensive and 
disruptive.”274 She further reports that structural terms are 
idiosyncratic and depend largely on the involvement of particular 
SEC Enforcement Division personnel.275 She notes further that much 
of the negotiation tends to boil down to the question of how many 
executives the company is willing to fire.276 From this perspective, 
compliance sounds much more like a “check-the-box effort” and 
hardly like an idealized mix of pluralistic governance approaches.  
Garrett, who has studied a number of domestic and foreign 
corporation settlements with state and federal prosecutors, finds 
                                                                                                                    
The two decades of anti-kickback enforcement has been a cat-and-mouse 
game between enforcers and the health industry. The government promulgates 
safe harbor regulations, guidelines, fraud alerts, opinion letters, and [corporate 
integrity agreements] signaling behaviors it deems illegal and the principles 
underlying its legal interpretations. Industry then eliminates those practices but 
adopts alternative practices that have not been expressly prohibited. 
Boozang & Handler-Hutchinson, supra note 217, at 98. 
 271. See ERNST & YOUNG, GROWING BEYOND: A PLACE FOR INTEGRITY: 12TH GLOBAL 
FRAUD SURVEY 2, 4 (2012), http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/Global-Fraud-Survey-a-
place-for-integrity-12th-Global-Fraud-Survey/$FILE/EY-12th-GLOBAL-FRAUD-SURVEY.pdf 
(noting that the risk of fraud is increasing); see also Pamela H. Bucy et al., Why Do They Do It?: 
The Motives, Mores, and Character of White Collar Criminals, 82 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 401, 
404–05 (2008) (citing the Association of Certified Fraud Examiner’s study regarding 
prevalence of fraud in corporations and other organizations). 
 272. Cf. Joseph W. Yockey, Choosing Governance in the FCPA Reform Debate, 38 J. 
CORP. L. 325, 338 (contending that “a certain degree of ambiguity is necessary to fulfill the 
FCPA’s purpose of deterring corruption”). 
 273. Jayne W. Barnard, Corporate Therapeutics at the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, 2008 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 793, 794–95; Brandon L. Garrett, Structural Reform 
Prosecution, 93 VA. L. REV. 853, 936 (2007). 
 274. Barnard, supra note 273, at 817 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 275. Id. at 818–19. 
 276. Id. at 828. But see id. (“[T]he defenestration of top managers in anticipation of 
settlement is less common than it was just two years ago.”). 
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evidence of good-faith attempts to improve internal compliance, along 
with some alarming examples of prosecutorial rent-seeking.277 Like 
Barnard, Garrett finds a lack of uniformity in compliance 
requirements, and little evidence that prosecutors keep track of these 
reforms after they impose them.278 Some of Garrett’s concerns have 
been echoed by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO), 
whose December 2009 report to Congress observed that the 
Department of Justice (DOJ) had just begun to improve its internal 
tracking of outstanding deferred prosecution (DPA) and 
nonprosecution (NPA) agreements,279 but that the DOJ had yet to 
figure out how to measure their individual and overall effectiveness: 
“DOJ lacks performance measures to assess how DPAs and NPAs 
contribute to its efforts to combat corporate crime.”280 Apparently in 
response to this problem, the DOJ noted in its 2013 budget proposal 
that putting in place a tracking system that ensures that corporate 
offenders are abiding by the terms of their settlement agreements was 
a “Priority Goal.”281 Even this additional information—however 
valuable—fails to tell us how effective compliance is in reducing 
wrongdoing.  
Thus, the compliance industry’s ultimate value remains unverified. 
Why? Some might conclude that the problem is that the government 
and corporate entities have embraced compliance and risk 
management in an overly ad hoc matter; others might contend that 
corporate officers and directors, who have no true interest in reducing 
the incidence of wrongdoing, simply abuse these platforms for their 
own purposes.282 Still others might argue that compliance and risk 
management are relatively young and nascent disciplines and that true 
                                                                                                                    
 277. Garrett, supra note 273, at 857, 860.  
 278. Brandon L. Garrett, Globalized Corporate Prosecutions, 97 VA. L. REV. 1775, 1847 
(2011) (“The compliance measures that prosecutors require range widely and it is not clear to 
what extent prosecutors review or supervise their effectiveness.”). 
 279. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-110, CORPORATE CRIME: DOJ HAS 
TAKEN STEPS TO BETTER TRACK ITS USE OF DEFERRED AND NON-PROSECUTION AGREEMENTS, 
BUT SHOULD EVALUATE EFFECTIVENESS 17 (2009), http://www.gao.gov/assets/300/299781.pdf 
(noting that the DOJ had just begun to track deferred prosecution and non-prosecution 
agreements issued by component departments and United States Attorneys’ Offices). 
 280. Introduction to id.; see also id. at 21. 
 281. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SUMMARY OF 2013 BUDGET REQUEST AND PERFORMANCE, 
14 (2013), http://www.justice.gov/jmd/2013summary/pdf/fy13-bud-summary-request-
performance.pdf. 
 282. See First, supra note 64, at 91–92 (worrying that the possibility of deferred 
prosecution agreement reduces corporations’ incentives to self-police). A variant of this 
argument is that policing imposes a “placebo effect” on potential victims, causing them to 
become less vigilant because they assume others will detect and punish wrongdoing. See 
Amitai Aviram, The Placebo Effect of Law: Law’s Role in Manipulating Perceptions, 75 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 54, 57–61 (2006). 
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best practices have yet to emerge.283  
All of these arguments are plausible. It may be, however, that our 
laws encourage a certain mix of compliance strategies that hinders the 
development of effective responses to corporate misconduct. The next 
section considers this possibility in greater detail.  
B.  Understanding the Preference for Policing 
Assuming some mix of temporal inconsistency and opportunistic 
motivation, the ideal compliance program would include both 
architectural and policing approaches to the risk of wrongdoing. It 
would include strategies designed to confront temporal inconsistency 
as well as more covert efforts to identify and root out rank 
opportunism. It would include audits and swift sanctions, but it also 
would include an array of precommitment devices and structural 
protections. It would promote overt monitoring and gentle reminders, 
but it would also countenance covert investigations and periodic 
punishments of willful misconduct.  
As Section IV.A suggested, however, certain groups skew 
corporate choices in the direction of policing and away from 
architecture. This Section provides a thumbnail sketch of who those 
groups are and why they prefer policing. 
1.  Moral Objectors and Government Enforcers 
Those who perceive corporate wrongdoing as a distinctly moral 
transgression may prefer policing to architecture because policing is 
intimately related to punishment.284 If corporate wrongdoing is the 
result of morally objectionable conduct, then wrongdoing merits 
punishment. Punishment, in turn, entails the singling out of 
individuals who have harmed others. From this perspective, policing 
should predominate, since it serves as the precursor to corporate 
                                                                                                                    
 283. For a discussion of compliance “best practices” and the observation that “best 
practices” established by so-called compliance experts are being bypassed by Dodd-Frank 
“bounty-hunting,” see Vega, supra note 252, at 519–20. See David Zaring, Best Practices, 81 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 294, 298 (2006) for an argument that “best practice[]” regimes can devolve into 
“common practice[]” regimes. 
 284. Professor Deborah DeMott has criticized ERM’s “neutral” systems-based language 
for failing to take into account the normative aspects of legal noncompliance: 
To the extent the law is treated as simply a source of “risk” that may for this 
purpose be homogenized with risks stemming from other sources, it is 
incorporated within a risk-management framework as another constraint on 
conduct, “not norms that express views of right conduct or desirable states of 
the world.”  
DeMott, supra note 254, at 469 (quoting Robert W. Gordon, A New Role for Lawyers?: The 
Corporate Counselor After Enron, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1185, 1192 (2003)). 
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discipline, which in turn functions as a kind of punishment for 
individual corporate officers and directors.285  
Along the same vein, public enforcers also skew the compliance 
officer’s calculus in favor of policing.286 From the public enforcer’s 
perspective, corporate policing serves two ends. It helps the 
government prosecute and punish wrongdoers after harm has occurred 
and it enhances deterrence before harm occurs.287 Because of 
information asymmetries, the corporation can self-police more easily 
than external enforcers.288 The government’s reliance on corporate 
compliance, in turn, frees up resources that it can then expend on 
recidivist and (presumably) more dangerous firms.289  
The key method by which prosecutors and regulators demand 
policing is by defining the term “compliance” to include corporate-
wide investigative disciplinary measures. The Principles of Federal 
Prosecution of Business Organizations, the primary guidance 
document the DOJ publishes for its U.S. Attorneys’ Offices regarding 
charging decisions for business organizations, explicitly advises 
prosecutors to assess whether a corporation’s compliance program 
functions effectively.290 The DOJ does not define the term “effective,” 
but instead advises prosecutors to discern the difference between a 
good-faith effort and a mere “paper program.”291  
                                                                                                                    
 285. See Ellen S. Podgor, Educating Compliance, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1523, 1527 
(2009) (“A highlight of most deferred prosecution agreements [between prosecutors and 
corporations] is a requirement that the corporation cooperate with the government by providing 
evidence of wrongdoing by individuals within the company.”). 
 286. See Buell, supra note 70, at 1625–26. 
 287. See id. 
 288. Professor Arlen has argued that corporations “are uniquely positioned to intervene ex 
ante to deter crime through their ability to structure compensation and promotion policies so as 
to make crime less profitable.” Jennifer Arlen, Corporate Criminal Liability: Theory and 
Evidence, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF CRIMINAL LAW 144, 144 (Alon 
Harel & Keith N. Hylton eds., 2012). 
Professor Buell contends that corporations are better positioned to police their own 
employees. Buell, supra note 70, at 1626 (“The firm is much closer to the action, better 
educated about the activities under scrutiny, and a more efficient user of enforcement 
resources.”). 
 289. See AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 189, at 103–06; see also Kagan et al., supra 
note 168, at 39 (observing reliance on internal compliance efforts, in part because “legal 
coercion is expensive and difficult”). For an empirical analysis of self-policing and an 
argument that “self-reporting can be a useful tool for reliably identifying and leveraging the 
voluntary self-policing efforts of regulated companies,” see Michael W. Toffel & Jodi L. Short, 
Coming Clean and Cleaning Up: Does Voluntary Self-Reporting Indicate Effective Self-
Policing?, 54 J.L. & ECON. 609, 611 (2011). 
 290. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL 9-28.800(B) 
(2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/title9/28mcr 
m.htm. 
 291. Id. 
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Superficially, the principles are fairly open-ended, permitting the 
corporate compliance officer to mix structural approaches with 
standard policing efforts.292 Nevertheless, the DOJ reveals its 
preference when it advises prosecutors to consider, among other 
factors, “any remedial actions taken by the corporation, including, for 
example, disciplinary action against past violators uncovered by the 
prior compliance program.”293 As this statement makes clear, the 
corporation’s safe harbor resides in substantial expenditures for 
policing, not architecture. A record of aggressive audits followed by 
swift terminations and corporate-wide shaming demonstrates to public 
enforcers the corporation’s commitment to nurturing a law-abiding, 
ethical culture. Experimentation with precommitment devices may be 
the icing on the cake (particularly when they work well), but it is the 
record of “remedial actions” and “disciplinary action against past 
violators” that matters most to prosecutors when they consider a 
corporate indictment.  
Should there be any doubt as to this last point, consider a recent 
organization-wide indictment, United States v. S.A.C. Capital 
Advisors, LP.294 SAC, the eponymous hedge fund founded by Steven 
A. Cohen, was indicted on charges that it failed to supervise its 
employees and effectively permitted and encouraged insider 
trading.295 The indictment was notable in that it demonstrated the 
various ways in which SAC’s compliance program was an abject 
failure—with regard to policing and architecture.296 Nevertheless, the 
most memorable failures related to the department’s policing 
function: the compliance department failed to screen employees; 
lacked adequate monitoring systems; conducted few internal 
investigations; and concluded from these few investigations that no 
wrongdoing had occurred.297  
SAC’s prosecution may well be salutary insofar as it encourages 
the hedge fund industry to pay greater attention to compliance. 
Nevertheless, a public indictment that highlights the various ways in 
which a corporation’s compliance personnel failed to police 
themselves will inevitably cause compliance officers at other 
                                                                                                                    
 292. See id. 
 293. Id. 
 294. Sealed Indictment, United States v. S.A.C. Capital Advisors, L.P., No. 13-cr-00541 
(S.D.N.Y. July 23, 2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/nys/pressreleases/July13/S 
ACChargingAndSupportingDocuments/SAC%20Indictment%20(Stamped).pdf; see also James 
O’Toole, SAC Indictment Depicts Culture of Law-Breaking, CNNMONEY (July 30, 2013), 
http://money.cnn.com/2013/07/26/investing/sac-insider-trading/index.html (describing the SAC 
compliance department’s permissiveness). 
 295. Sealed Indictment, supra note 294, ¶ 1. 
 296. Id. passim. 
 297. Id. ¶¶ 24–29. 
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companies to conclude that the remedy for insufficient compliance is 
to bulk up one’s surveillance and internal punishment apparatus. With 
the chair of the SEC announcing the Commission’s intention to make 
itself into a “tougher cop,” one can hardly fault that choice.298   
2.  Monitoring Boards 
The corporation’s board of directors, particularly its composition 
and its members’ preferences, also affect the corporation’s choice of 
policing and architectural approaches. Compliance officers often 
report to the corporation’s board of directors, either indirectly, 
through the corporation’s general counsel, or directly.299 Particularly 
when corporate fraud is salient, board members care greatly about the 
shape and content of the corporate compliance program.  
Years ago, corporate scholars observed the transformation of the 
American corporate board from one that provided strategic advice on 
operations (the “managerial” board) to one that checked corporate 
management’s tendency to shirk and take advantage of ill-informed 
shareholders (the “monitoring” board).300 One of the hallmarks of the 
monitoring board was that its members were independent, divorced 
from the daily operations of the corporation.301 Independence, in turn, 
would reduce conflicts of interest and ensure proper monitoring on 
behalf of the corporation’s shareholders.302 In the wake of the 
                                                                                                                    
298. Sue Reisinger, SEC Chair Wants to Retool Agency as “Tough Cop,” CORPORATE 
COUNSEL (Sept. 27, 2013), http://www.corpcounsel.com/id=1202621030557 (reporting on 
Commissioner Mary Jo White’s “tough cop” speech to the Council of Institutional Investors in 
Chicago). 
 299. See U.S. SENTENCING COMMISSION GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1(b)(2)(C) (2012) 
(noting that person(s) responsible for daily compliance operations should “report periodically 
to high-level personnel and, as appropriate, to the governing authority, [i.e., the board] or an 
appropriate subgroup of the governing authority, on the effectiveness of the compliance and 
ethics program”). As a result of the Guidelines, fewer corporations require its compliance 
function to report directly to the corporation’s general counsel. PWC STUDY, supra note 224, at 
16. For a discussion of the growing split between those corporations that lodge compliance 
within the general counsel’s office and those that treat it as a separate, free-standing function, 
see DeStefano, supra note 19. 
 300. See generally Jill E. Fisch, Taking Boards Seriously, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 265, 268–
72 (1997) (describing the rise of the monitoring board). 
 301. See Ribstein, supra note 231, at 11 (“The basic theory is that the corporation’s main 
decision-making body should include a majority of ‘independent’ directors who do not work 
full-time for the corporation and therefore theoretically are in a position to watch over the 
insiders, with wholly independent ‘audit’ and ‘nominating’ committees that work with the 
company’s auditing firm and control election of directors.”). 
 302. See Sharpe, supra note 202, at 33 (“The contemporary model of corporate 
governance reform has assumed that if the definition of independence is changed to include 
more observable traits of independence, firms will perform better.”). Sharpe goes on to 
question this view. See id. at 33 & n.192 (citing research indicating that firms with independent 
directors do not necessarily perform better). 
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accounting scandals in the late 1990s, the government and the stock 
exchanges put in place a number of rules that altered the composition 
and annual responsibility of board members. The stock exchanges’ 
listing requirements and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act require a publicly 
traded company to maintain a majority of independent directors on its 
boards, and an all-independent audit committee;303 the recently 
enacted Dodd-Frank Act extends the independence obligation to 
members of the board’s compensation committee.304 
Putting aside the larger debate as to whether outsiders or insiders 
are better positioned to monitor the corporation’s officers and 
employees,305 it is not too difficult to see why an independent board 
might prefer policing to architecture.306  
Examining the firm’s architecture is a highly contextual and 
qualitative exercise. It requires an outside director to invest a fair 
amount of time learning about the corporation and the particular 
device (or devices) that have been selected within each division. It 
requires the director to understand the firm, its context, and the 
particular commitment device. By contrast, policing is more 
susceptible to quantitative measurement, even if that measurement is 
itself misleading. A director can rely more easily on reports regarding 
the number of audits performed, compliance personnel hired, and 
incidences reported.307 Just as it is easier for a regulator to verify 
policing, so too is it easier for an independent director to monitor 
                                                                                                                    
 303. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 301, 116 Stat. 745, 775–76 
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78j-1(m)) (requiring an independent audit committee); Eric M. Fogel 
& Andrew M. Geier, Strangers in the House: Rethinking Sarbanes-Oxley and the Independent 
Board of Directors, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 33, 39, 41–42 (2007) (noting that Sarbanes-Oxley did 
not impose any requirements for independent directors, but that the New York Stock Exchange 
and NASDAQ Stock Market “submitted to the SEC new listing standards” that required a 
majority of independent directors). 
 304. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, § 952, 124 Stat. 1376, 1900–01 (2010). 
 305. Compare Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Non-Correlation Between Board 
Independence and Long-Term Firm Performance, 27 J. CORP. L. 231, 233 (2002) (finding that 
the belief that firms with more independent boards perform better is unsupported), and 
Romano, supra note 231, at 1530–32 (noting that the literature suggests that “independent 
boards do not improve performance and that boards with too many outsiders may . . . have a 
negative impact on performance”), with Prentice & Spence, supra note 234, at 1844–45 
(disagreeing with Romano). 
 306. For the inside versus outside director debate, see Simmons, supra note 241, at 1155–
57; for an analysis of the differences between in-house and external counsel as monitors of 
corporate misconduct, see Sung Hui Kim, Gatekeepers Inside Out, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 
411, 413–14 (2008). 
 307. According to the PricewaterhouseCoopers Compliance Survey conducted in 2012, 
compliance officers rely on, among other metrics, audits, third party complaints, employee 
disclosures, hotline reports, and training completion reports to gauge compliance effectiveness. 
PWC STUDY, supra note 224, at 13. 
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policing, particularly when that director sits on more than one board. 
3.  Managers 
Corporate managers also should prefer policing to architecture. 
The former may be intrusive, but corporate architecture poses a much 
greater long-term threat to the corporate officer’s operational 
discretion.308 By definition, precommitment devices narrow the 
decision maker’s options. In contrast, policing leaves corporate 
officers a “sporting chance” to escape detection and punishment.309 
Opportunists optimistic about their abilities to avoid detection will 
therefore choose policing over architecture.  
More importantly, managers may reject corporate architecture for 
entirely legitimate pro-social reasons. If a manager sincerely believes 
that corporate compliance personnel are unskilled, risk averse, or 
otherwise likely to prefer overly restrictive precommitment devices 
that squelch innovation and competition in an aggressive market, the 
manager’s choice represents nothing more than a rational attempt to 
preserve the company’s operational performance.  
4.  Compliance Officers 
Given the foregoing, compliance officers should also rationally 
prefer policing to architecture, particularly if they believe they can 
more easily validate policing in the event of a future compliance 
failure.310 Indeed, should an affirmative “compliance defense” ever 
materialize in corporate prosecutions, this preference is likely to 
become even stronger.311 Quantitative efforts are simply easier to 
demonstrate and verify than qualitative efforts, and where uncertainty 
prevails, we should expect risk-averse compliance officers to seek 
assurance from a bevy of easily proven policing efforts.  
Readers should notice the feedback loop this preference creates for 
the compliance industry itself. Law enforcement agencies prefer 
policing because it increases their ability to identify and punish 
wrongdoers. Compliance officers prefer policing because it is easier 
                                                                                                                    
 308. Cf. Bainbridge, supra note 17, at 2–3 (providing examples of precommitment 
strategies in corporations). 
 309. Cf. Cheng, supra note 137, at 681–83 (discussing speeding and a “sporting chance”). 
 310. See Yockey, supra note 272, at 357 (“[O]ne danger posed by the current enforcement 
climate is that it encourages firms to focus primarily on compliance strategies they can defend 
later should they happen to come under investigation.”). 
 311. A number of scholars and practitioners have argued for a corporate compliance 
defense, particularly in regard to prosecutions of violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act. See, e.g., Mike Koehler, Revisiting a Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Compliance Defense, 
2012 WIS. L. REV. 609. For a particularly thoughtful evaluation of the costs and benefits of 
such a defense, see generally Peter J. Henning, Be Careful What You Wish for: Thoughts on a 
Compliance Defense Under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 883 (2012). 
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to verify and, in any event, it appears to be the preferred approach 
among most stakeholders. Those who sell compliance products to 
corporations have every reason to develop sophisticated policing tools 
and to develop structural innovations with an eye towards enhanced 
policing.  
CONCLUSION 
Corporate fraud is a two-faced problem. People are, by differing 
degrees, inclined to hurt themselves and others. Corporate firms 
therefore must address two different and interconnecting dispositions, 
opportunism and temporal inconsistency. To address both of these 
problems, a corporation should adopt an integrated response that 
promotes a combination of policing and structural commitment 
devices. Do our legal institutions support this pluralistic approach?  
Superficially, the answer is “yes”: free-standing compliance and 
risk-management programs offer corporate actors the ability to choose 
policing and structure as they see fit. Indeed, the government’s 
unwillingness to define “adequate” compliance with specifity may 
even be a plus.  
Nevertheless, a number of factors push the corporation towards 
policing and away from the architectural approach. An excessive 
reliance on policing, in turn, may explain compliance’s disappointing 
results in terms of reducing overall fraud. Policing can deter and 
screen out some of the worst wrongdoers, but it is not likely to cure 
those violations that arise from temporal inconsistency. 
The takeaway here is not a prescription for new regulations or 
laws, but instead a call for further inquiry and analysis. Experimental 
researchers can examine the interaction between opportunism and 
temporal inconsistency. Interpretive scholars can pay closer attention 
to the two dispositions when they conduct after the fact analyses of 
corporate scandals. Empirical researchers, who have already studied 
the effect of “norms” on corporate compliance, should expand their 
focus to temporal inconsistency and its interaction with opportunism 
and compliance outcomes.  
Meanwhile, corporate enforcers, the general counsels and other 
personnel who evaluate entity-level compliance, should give more 
thought to the ways in which they construct their compliance 
program. Note that this analysis requires more than a simple review of 
the program’s size or budget. For structural approaches to work, 
corporate enforcers must have requisite freedom to design and test 
precommitment and targeted-enforcement devices.  
The most vexatious quality of our current legal regime is its 
tendency to frame the corporate compliance platform as a replica of 
the familiar trial-and-punishment paradigm. This is not the case with 
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corporate law generally. As corporate scholars have pointed out, 
corporate law precommits both corporate managers and shareholders 
in numerous ways.312 The state law framework that scholars praise for 
its enabling character is nevertheless embedded with a number of 
option-disabling devices. Why has a similar framework not emerged 
in the corporate compliance context?  
Courts have intoned that fraud “is as old as falsehood and as 
versable as human ingenuity.”313 Although corporate policing may not 
be as old as fraud, it certainly is as entrenched. In response to a mass 
of laws and regulations, corporations routinely surround themselves 
with audits, internal surveillance systems, hotlines, and cultural and 
educational initiatives. To a large extent, this activity should be 
lauded, as it plays a strong role in counteracting opportunistic 
behavior. But policing is ultimately a blunt instrument, whose power 
is limited. To truly confront corporate fraud’s two faces, the corporate 
enforcer must utilize a more nuanced strategy, one that addresses our 
tendency to take advantage not only of others, but also of ourselves.  
                                                                                                                    
 312. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 17, at 7 (“Many provisions of a corporation’s 
articles of incorporation and bylaws in fact are best understood as other-regarding 
precommitments . . . .”); Lynn A. Stout, The Shareholder as Ulysses: Some Empirical Evidence 
on Why Investors in Public Corporations Tolerate Board Governance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 667 
(2003) (discussing primarily why shareholders are “bound” to their board). 
 313. Weiss v. United States, 122 F.2d 675, 681 (5th Cir. 1941). 
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